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Abstract
We show that the Folk Theorem holds for n-player discounted repeated games with
bounded memory (recall) strategies. Our main result demonstrates that any payoff
profile that exceeds the pure minmax payoff profile can be approximately sustained
by a pure strategy finite memory subgame perfect equilibrium of the repeated game if
the players are sufficiently patient. We also show that the result can be extended to
any payoff profile that exceeds the mixed minmax payoff profile if players can random-
ize at each stage of the repeated game. Our results requires neither time-dependent
strategies, nor public randomization, nor any communication. The type of strategies
we employ to establish our result turn out to have new features that may be important
in understanding repeated interactions.
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1 Introduction
The extensive multiplicity of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) payoffs in repeated games,
exemplified by the Folk Theorem, is due to players’ ability to condition their behavior arbi-
trarily on the past (see Mailath and Samuelson (2006)). Therefore, it is reasonable to expect,
as suggested by Aumann (1981), that this multiplicity may be reduced if players have lim-
ited memory in the sense that they can condition their strategies only on the outcome of a
limited number of past periods.
In Barlo, Carmona, and Sabourian (2009), we show that this intuition, however, does not
hold when the set of actions in the stage game of the repeated game is sufficiently “large”
so that each payoff profile is not isolated. In such games we prove that the Folk Theorem
with SPE as the solution concept (henceforth, we shall refer to such Folk Theorems by FT)
continues to hold with one period memory strategies where at each date players’ behavior
depends only on the outcome of the game in the previous period. The large action space
assumption is critical in establishing this result because it allows players to encode the entire
history of the past into the previous period’s actions.
In the same study, we show that when the action spaces are not large, it is possible that
no efficient payoff vector can be supported by a one period memory SPE strategy profile
even if the discount factor is near one, validating the argument of Aumann (1981) with
one period memory strategies and finite actions. Hence, the question is whether or not
the multiplicity of equilibrium payoffs prevails with finite actions and limited memory (not
necessarily restricted to be one period). More specifically, does the FT depend critically on
being able to recall the history of play all the way back to the beginning?
The current paper establishes that the FT for discounted repeated games continues to
hold with time-independent bounded memory strategies even when the action sets are finite.
Our main result displays that, when players are sufficiently patient, any feasible payoff vector
that guarantees each player at least his pure strategy minmax payoff (individually rational
payoffs) can be approximately sustained by a pure SPE strategy profile of the repeated game
that at each stage recalls the outcomes of finite number of previous periods.1 Furthermore,
1As it is the case for Fudenberg and Maskin’s (1986) FT results, our FT result with more than 2 players
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we show that the bound on the number of periods that the players need to recall to establish
this result is uniform in the level of discounting, and depends only on the desired degree of
payoff approximation.
With no memory restriction, the FT result with mixed (behavioral) strategies is stronger
than that with pure strategies. This is because for any player the mixed strategy minmax
payoff may be lower than the pure strategy minmax payoff. To complete the analysis of re-
peated games with finite memory, we extend our result for pure strategies to show that with
three or more players, if players are sufficiently patient and are allowed to use behavioral
strategies, then any payoff vector that guarantees each player at least his mixed minmax
payoff profile can be approximately sustained by a behavioral SPE strategy profile that at
each stage recalls the outcomes of finite number of previous periods. The following points
need to be emphasized regarding our finite memory mixed FT result: First, it assumes that
the players observe only the outcome of past randomizations (and not the randomization
devices used in the past).2 Second, it is obtained without introducing any public randomiza-
tion or any external communication devices. Third, in contrast to our pure strategy result,
the bound on the number of periods that the players need to recall to establish the mixed
FT is not uniform in the level of discounting.
In this paper, memory refers to the number of past periods the players can recall.3 An
alternative way of imposing bounds on the memory is to limit the strategies to those that
can be implemented by finite automata or more general Turing machines (see, for example,
Ben-Porath and Peleg (1987), Kalai and Stanford (1988), Anderlini and Sabourian (1995)).4
With finite action spaces, assuming bounded memory as in our paper, is a stronger restriction
is established for generic games.
2If randomization devices employed in the past are observable then the repeated game with mixed strate-
gies is equivalent to one with a continuum of action space at each stage. Hence, it follows from Theorem 9
of Barlo, Carmona, and Sabourian (2009) that the mixed FT holds with 1-period memory.
3Our definition of memory follows those by Kalai and Stanford (1988), Sabourian (1998) and Barlo,
Carmona, and Sabourian (2009). In the literature, strategies with such bounds on the memory are also
referred to as bounded recall strategies.
4Another approach to memory limitation is one of modeling strategies as a neural network; see Cho
(1994).
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than assuming that strategies can be represented by finite automata.5 Effectively, while in
both bounded memory and finite automata approaches, at each stage the players can have
access to a finite amount of information about the past, the latter approach gives the players
the flexibility of choosing which information about the past can be retained (for example
who has been the last deviator), whereas the former approach has no such flexibility as
the information from distant past is permanently erased and players can only access recent
information. This lack of flexibility makes it significantly more difficult to establish a FT
type result with bounded memory than in the case with finite automata.
While one issue in repeated game literature concerns the multiplicity of equilibrium
payoffs, another is about understanding the precise behavior that satisfies intertemporal
incentives in repeated contexts. Our result is important not only because it shows that the
FT does not depend on being able to recall the history of play all the way back to the
beginning, but also because the kind of strategies/behavior needed to ensure intertemporal
incentives with limited memory turn out to have new features that may be significant in
understanding repeated interactions.
There are many reasons why one might be interested in results with limited memory.
First, there is the bounded rationality aspect in which players can only recall a finite amount
of public information concerning the past. For example, having access to past information can
be costly for the individual and in equilibrium players may choose to recall a finite past. The
results from psychological literature also indicate that people do not act on the entire history
they observe and pay special attention to recent history. Second, in many institutional set-
ups it is the convention to remove all the records after a certain number of years (possibly
because of cost of storage of past records). Third, even if players use memory devices, such
as pieces of paper or money, to keep track of the past,6 these devices often become unusable
after a certain number of years (e.g., the messages written become unreadable or coins
fully depreciate). Finally, memory size may have implications for robustness of equilibria.
For example, Mailath and Morris (2002) and Mailath and Morris (2006) show that private
5Every bounded memory strategy can be implemented by a finite automaton, whereas this is not the case
the other way round.
6In the (finite) automata representation of behavior, the states of the machine correspond to such devices.
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monitoring perturbations of public monitoring equilibria are robust if the equilibria have
bounded recall.
To appreciate the difficulties and the novel behavioral features needed in establishing
a FT with bounded memory, consider a typical pure “simple” strategy SPE profile used
in proving a pure FT in n-player repeated games. Such a strategy profile is described by
n + 1 infinite paths pi(0), pi(1), . . . , pi(n) consisting of the equilibrium path of play pi(0) and a
punishment path pi(i) for each player i (see Abreu (1988)). The strategies are such that game
begins with pi(0) until some player deviates singly from pi(0). At any stage, a single deviation
by a player from any ongoing path triggers the punishment path for that player; otherwise,
the game continues with the ongoing path.
In the first instance, it may seem that the problem of implementing such a simple profile
with bounded memory is trivial if the memory size M is sufficiently large. In particular, if
each of the n + 1 paths has a finite cycle, then each can be distinguished and implemented
as long as M is sufficiently large. Even when the paths are not finite, one can approximate
the payoff corresponding to each path by a cyclical path. Therefore, finite memory should
be sufficient to implement the paths approximately. But this is not enough. Strategies must
also be such that after observing the outcomes of the previous M periods the following two
critical properties hold: First, single player deviations can be detected. Second, the identity
of the deviator is revealed. If either of the above two properties were not to hold, there
might be incentives for some player to deviate and manipulate the path of future play.7
With 1-period memory it is easy to see how such simple strategies may violate the above
properties. For example, consider any two action profiles a and b respectively belonging to
two paths pi(i) and pi(j), for some i and j. Then the first property is violated if, for some
player k, ak 6= bk and a−k = b−k. This is because when (bk, a−k) = b is observed, it is not
clear if k has just deviated from pi(i) and the punishment for k needs to be triggered or if the
path pi(j) is being followed and no deviation has occurred. Similarly, the second property is
violated if, for a pair of players k and l, al 6= bl, ak 6= bk and a−l,k = b−l,k. This is because
in this case when (bk, al, a−k,l) = (bk, al, b−k,l) is observed, it is not clear which of the two
7In Barlo, Carmona, and Sabourian (2009) we refer to simple strategies that satisfy the above two
properties as “confusion-proof”.
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players k or l has deviated.
Does increasing the memory size help with ensuring that the above two properties hold?
The next two examples show that these difficulties cannot be solved so easily even with large,
but finite, memory.
Example 1: Consider a Prisoners’ Dilemma in which at every date each player can either
cooperate C or defect D. Suppose that the players are sufficiently patient and we want to
implement a cycle path pi(0) = {pit}∞t=1 consisting of playing ((C,D), (D,C)) repeatedly.
Assume that such a path yields for each player an average payoff strictly higher than the
minmax payoff generated from playing (D,D).8 The simple strategy that plays pi(0) on the
equilibrium path and plays (D,D) forever for any history inconsistent with the equilibrium
path, is subgame perfect with unbounded memory. However, this strategy is not subgame
perfect if players can remember at most an arbitrary but finite number M of past periods.
To see this, consider any history with its last M entries (henceforth called the M -tail) equal
to (a1, pi2, . . . , piM), for any a1 6= pi1. Then the simple strategy prescribes playing D for both
players forever in the continuation game. But if piM = (D,C), then player 1 has the incentive
to deviate. This is because if player 1 plays C instead of D at this history, the play returns
to the equilibrium path in the next period, as (pi2, . . . , piM , piM+1) would be recalled. In the
case when piM = (C,D), by an analogous reasoning, player 2 has an incentive to deviate.
One way to overcome this difficulty may be to allow the play to continue along the
equilibrium path even at some histories that are inconsistent with the equilibrium path.
However, this alone is not sufficient. For example, consider a strategy profile that is other-
wise identical to the above simple strategy profile except that it plays piM+1 at any history
whose M -tail equals (a1, pi2, . . . , piM) for any a1. In this case, if piM = (D,C), then player
2 will find it profitable to deviate from D to C at any history with its M -tail equal to
8Note that (C,D) and (D,C) may be the only efficient action profile in a Prisoner’s Dilemma. One such
example is:
C D
C 2, 2 0, 5
D 5, 0 1, 1
Here, playing ((C,D), (D,C)) repeatedly induces the symmetric efficient payoff as the discount factor goes
to 1.
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(a2, a1, pi2, . . . , piM−1), for any a1 6= pi1 and any a2. By doing so, he produces a history with
its M -tail equal to (a1, pi2, . . . , piM) and brings the play back to the equilibrium path.9 Thus,
if we continue to change the strategy by allowing the play to return to the equilibrium path
at these problematic histories, an inductive argument would imply that the play must be the
equilibrium path after any possible history, a requirement clearly incompatible with subgame
perfection.10
The above example shows that increasing the memory size by itself does not guarantee
that the players can identify whether or not there has been a deviation. The next example
shows that the problem of detecting the identity of the deviator can also not be easily resolved
by having a large but finite memory.
Example 2: In this example there are three players, each player i = 1, 2, 3 has three
(pure) actions αi, βi and γi in the stage game and the players discount the future by an
arbitrarily small amount. Let α = (α1, α2, α3) and suppose that the stage payoff ui for each
i is such that the (pure) action profile that minmaxes i is mi = (βi, α−i). Also, suppose that,
for each i = 1, 2, 3, mi is a Nash equilibrium of the stage game and ui(m
i) < ui(m
j) for all
j = 0, . . . , 3, j 6= i, where m0 = (γ1, γ2, γ3).11 Then with no memory restriction the simple
strategy profile defined by an equilibrium path pi(0) = {m0,m0, . . .} and a punishment path
pi(i) = {mi,mi, . . .} for each i = 1, 2, 3, implements m0 as a SPE.
Such a simple strategy profile has the two features that, when a deviator is identified, the
punishment path for that player is implemented and that, after any history, the continuation
path corresponds to one of the four paths pi(0), . . . , pi(3). With finite memory, irrespective
of how large the memory is, implementing m0 as a SPE with strategies that have these
two features is no longer feasible. To see this, fix the memory to be M and any strategy
profile f with these features. By the second feature, at any history with its M -tail equal to
(α, α, . . . α) the continuation strategy prescribes playing a path pi(j), for some j = 0, . . . , 3.
Consider any player i 6= j. Since f must play m0 initially, by the first feature, if i deviates
9If piM = (C,D), player 1 has an incentive to deviate when (a2, a1, pi2, . . . , piM−1) is recalled.
10Barlo and Carmona (2007), a predecessor to the current paper, considers the repeated Prisoners’
Dilemma with bounded memory. Example 1 is from this paper, which in turn attributes it to an anonymous
referee.
11It is easy to construct an example with payoffs satisfying these properties.
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at date 1 by playing ai 6= m0i , then f induces mi at date 2. Also, if player i deviates again
from mi at date 2 by playing αi instead of m
i
i = βi, α will be observed and f would prescribe
playing mi again. Further, such deviations by i induce α again and thus, by induction, f
also specifies playing mi after a history consisting of (ai,m
0
−i) followed by α played (M − 1)
times. But then at such a history, player i can profitably deviate by playing αi and inducing
a history consisting of M consecutive α’s. This is because his average continuation payoff
from the deviation would be almost ui(m
j), whereas by not deviating he obtains ui(m
i).
The problem in the above example is that α could be the result of single deviation by 1
from m1, 2 from m2 or 3 from m3. Therefore, the history consisting of α played M times
can be induced by any player through a sequence of deviations and cannot be attributed to
deviations by any particular player. Hence, given that ui(m
i) < ui(m
j) for all j = 0, . . . , 3,
j 6= i, there must be some profitable opportunities for some player to deviate.
The problems of detecting the latest deviation and the identity of the deviator clearly do
not arise with unbounded memory because, for any history, one can use induction starting
from the first period of the history to find the latest deviation. With bounded memory, such
inductive reasoning, by definition, is not feasible. Therefore, to deal with these problems
with limited memory one needs to ensure that all of the paths that the candidate strategy
profile prescribes at each history are sufficiently distinct. This can be done if each action
profile in each path is distinct from those in other paths by at least three components (e.g.
Sabourian (1998)).12 In fact, the richness assumption in Barlo, Carmona, and Sabourian
(2009) allows one to prove a Folk Theorem with bounded memory precisely because with
rich action spaces, one can construct such paths at the cost of perturbing all the payoffs by a
small amount. With finite action spaces, such an approach to making each path sufficiently
distinct is clearly not possible.
Nevertheless, in this paper we show that the objective of making each path sufficiently
distinct, so that deviations and the identity of deviators can be detected, can be achieved by
ensuring that each path contains specific finite sequences of actions, henceforth referred to
as signalling sequences. Each of these signalling sequences is carefully designed so that, once
12Assuming such distinctness, Sabourian (1998) provides a characterization for the set of SPE outcomes
of repeated games for the case of no discounting and finite number of pure actions.
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any of them is observed, the paths or deviations are identified and the players know how to
play the continuation game without the need to know the entire past history. Furthermore,
our construction has the feature that some of these signalling sequences (those that do
not trigger player specific punishment) appear infinitely often along their respective path.
Effectively, such signal sequences can be thought of as a set of rituals that have to be played
every so often so that the players can coordinate their future play in an appropriate way to
preserve the intertemporal incentives.
Introduction of the signalling sequences generates additional sets of issues. First, we
also need to ensure that it is in the interest of the players to play these sequences. This
makes the construction of signalling sequences and punishment paths needed to induce them
rather intricate and complicated. At the same time, the signalling sequences must be almost
costless. We achieve this by ensuring that, for each path, the proportion of times its signalling
sequence occurs on the path is arbitrarily small. Since the lengths of these sequences are
bounded, this is feasible by making any cycle path, and hence the memory, sufficiently long.
Second, if the number of players n exceeds two, then any single player deviation from any
signalling sequence can be detected by considering what the others are doing, whereas this
is not feasible when n = 2. As a result, the proof of our FT for the case of pure strategies
is somewhat different when n = 2 from the case when n > 2.
There are also additional difficulties specific to proving the mixed FT. First, when a player
is being mixed minmaxed, other players may have to play a random strategy; but this is
difficult to enforce because mixed strategies are not observable. The standard construction
for dealing with this problem with unbounded memory is that of Fudenberg and Maskin
(1991). However, this method does not extend to the finite memory case (see section 5
for the intuition). Second, with mixed strategies the issue of distinguishing the signalling
sequences from the rest of the paths (and from single player deviations from them) is more
difficult because the signalling sequences need to be sufficiently distinct from any paths that
happens with positive probability after any history.13
13In our mixed FT randomization happens only when the players are being (approximately) minmaxed
and hence this issue relates only to distinguishing the signalling sequences from the random outcomes that
happen during the minmax phase.
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When the number of players exceeds 2, we deal with these two difficulties, and hence
extend our pure FT result to the mixed case, by using an alternative approach based on
Gossner (1995) and by appealing to some concentration result from probability theory and
by a careful design of the signalling sequences. Our pure FT with n = 2, however, does not
extend in a similar way to a mixed FT. Section 5.1 discusses the issues that may arise in
establishing a mixed FT when n = 2.
Our FT result is, however, an approximate one. With pure strategies, this is because
with finite action spaces the path induced by any bounded memory strategy, after every
history, must eventually enter a finite cycle. Since not all individually rational payoffs
can be implemented by finite cycles, it follows that the set of individually rational payoffs
can at best be implemented approximately, with larger memory being needed to improve
the approximation. In our mixed FT, the equilibrium paths we construct are still pure
(randomization happens only off the equilibrium when players are being minmaxed), hence
not all individually rational payoffs can be implemented.14
While our FT construction may require a large, but finite, memory (e.g. because the
length of the cycles needed to implement individual rational payoffs is long or because of the
need to make the signalling sequences almost costless), it is important to note that the aim
of our construction is to demonstrate what can possibly be implemented as an equilibrium in
most general settings; in specific cases, the construction can be made simpler and the memory
needed can be quite small. For example, the grim-trigger strategy in the Prisoners’ Dilemma
that implements cooperation trivially requires 1-period memory. Also, as we mentioned
before, Abreu-type simple strategy construction in which each action profile in each path is
distinct from those in other paths by at least three components requires 1-period memory.
14Appealing to public randomization on the equilibrium paths would clearly implement any individually
rational payoff exactly. But this is not sufficient to obtain an exact FT result. This is because, as we
mentioned before, any non-signalling part of any path that happens with a positive probability must be
sufficiently distinct from all the signalling sequences. Hence, any randomization on the equilibrium path
would still be restricted by the need to differentiate itself from the signalling sequences.
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2 Related Literature
In contrast to our results, in some related literature, bounds on the memory result in sig-
nificant reduction in the set of equilibria in repeated set-ups. However, these results require
additional assumption(s) beyond bounded memory. For example, Liu and Skrzypacz (2010)
show that in a dynamic model with one long-lived player facing a sequence of short-lived
players and complete information, bounds on the memory can have a dramatic impact on
the equilibrium set (only Nash equilibria of the stage game are consistent with limited mem-
ory). Their results, however, are critically dependent on players’ ability to condition their
behavior only on past actions of the other players (i.e., strategies are reactive).15
Cole and Kocherlakota (2005) consider the repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma with imperfect
public monitoring and finite memory. They show that, for some set of parameters, defection
every period is the only strongly symmetric public perfect equilibrium with bounded mem-
ory (regardless of the discount factor), whereas the set strongly symmetric public perfect
strategies with unbounded recall is strictly larger. The example considered by Cole and
Kocherlakota (2005) does not satisfy the identifiability condition used in Fudenberg, Levine,
and Maskin (1994) to establish their FT results for repeated games with imperfect monitor-
ing. By strengthening those identifiability conditions and by allowing asymmetric strategies,
Ho¨rner and Olszewski (2009) obtain a FT result with bounded memory strategies for games
with imperfect monitoring and finite action and outcomes spaces.
The construction in Ho¨rner and Olszewski (2009) faces similar difficulties as ours (and
additional ones since they allow for imperfect public monitoring) but is simplified by the
assumption that players can condition their play on calendar time, i.e. they use time-
dependent bounded memory strategies. This feature allows them to divide play into a
regular phase and a communication (signalling) phase that occur in a pre-specified set of
dates and to use the outcomes in the latter phase to coordinate future plays. Since calendar
15Anti FT type results have also been obtained with asynchronous choice in some cases. While some
of these results do not involve memory restrictions in the context of some games (Lagunoff and Matsui
1997), employing memory costs Bhaskar and Vega-Redondo (2002) establish that every finite memory Nash
equilibrium must be a Markovian strategy profile. It would be interesting to see how in our setup our FT
result with bounded memory would be affected if we were to introduce some degree of asynchronicity.
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time is unbounded and one of the reasons for limiting the analysis to bounded memory is
to bound the set of objects on which the players can condition their behavior, in contrast
to their work, in this paper we do not allow players to use time-dependent strategies. This
means that we cannot have a prespecified set of dates for communication, as a result, we
must ensure that players can understand from the play of the game when they are in the
communication/signalling phase and when there are in the regular phase. This integration of
the communication with the regular behavior in our setup makes the analysis quite intricate.
In addition to time-dependence, the results in Ho¨rner and Olszewski (2009) require the
existence of a public correlating device (a continuum of public signals) and is somewhat
weaker than the standard FT result for two-player games.16 Furthermore, the equilibria
that Ho¨rner and Olszewski (2009) construct also have the feature that the memory size
becomes arbitrarily large as the discount factor goes to one, and that players are indifferent
between several actions. In contrast, in our perfect monitoring set-up, we do not appeal to
any public randomizing device and the standard FT conclusions holds irrespective of the
number of players. Also, for our FT with pure strategies, the size of the memory needed to
establish the FT result is independent of the discount factor and the players do not need to
be indifferent between different actions in the equilibria that we construct – the equilibria
can be made essentially strict (see also footnote 21).17
Independently and at the same time as us, Mailath and Olszewski (2011) (henceforth,
MO) have also considered the problem of establishing a FT without the use of a randomizing
device for perfect monitoring set-ups with finite action spaces, with bounded memory and
with equilibria that are essentially strict.18 Their result is, however, a special case of our
16It shows that any payoff vector that Pareto dominate some static Nash equilibrium, rather than the
usual minmax payoff vector, can be achieved as an equilibrium.
17The result of Ho¨rner and Olszewski (2009) for the case of perfect monitoring, however, is not a special
case of our result because the existence of a rich set of public signals in their set-up allows them to establish
an exact FT in which every feasible payoff profile exceeding the mixed minmax payoff can be sustained as
an equilibrium payoff. Since we do not assume any public randomization, our FT results (both with pure or
mixed strategies) establish that every individually rational payoff vector can be approximately sustained as
an equilibrium payoff.
18Other works on repeated games with bounded (recall) memory include Kalai and Stanford (1988), Lehrer
(1988), Aumann and Sorin (1989), Lehrer (1994), Neyman and Okada (1999), Dutta and Siconolfi (2010),
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pure minmax FT. Specifically, they show that the FT holds with time-dependent bounded
memory in games with more than two players.19 Our pure minmax result is more general
than theirs because we do not require players to condition their strategies on calendar time
and because our FT also holds for two players.20
The aim of a great deal of the recent literature on FT is to provide a robustness check for
the validity of equilibrium payoffs and/or behaviour by making it harder for players to coordi-
nate on future play through the weakening of the perfect monitoring requirement. The main
motivation of MO is within this tradition, as they are primarily interested in demonstrat-
ing that the perfect monitoring FT is behaviorally robust to almost-perfect almost-public
private monitoring. As shown by MO, time-dependent bounded memory equilibria that are
essentially strict is all that is required for this (see footnote 21 for more details). Therefore,
their result is sufficient to establish that the above robustness exercise is valid for games
with more than two players.
This paper is part another kind of robustness check in which the coordination on future
play is made harder by restricting the set of strategies for reasons of memory, computation
or other kind of limitations. Specifically, and in contrast to both Ho¨rner and Olszewski
(2009) and Mailath and Olszewski (2011), we are interested in the robustness of the FT to
finite bounds on the set of objects on which the players can condition their behavior (i.e.
on the domain of the set of strategies) and wanted to treat time and history of past plays
symmetrically. With this in mind, we did not want to take the time-dependence route as
it allows for conditioning on an object that is unbounded.21 Furthermore, as mentioned
and Liu and Skrzypacz (2014).
19While the details are different, their construction has announcement phases at prespecified set of dates
that are inspired by the communication phases used in Ho¨rner and Olszewski (2009).
20The proof of the FT with two players in our first version of the paper was rather cumbersome. We have
simplified the proof as a result of conversations with George Mailath and Wojciech Olszewski. We would
like to thank them for these very useful conversations and wish to mention that MO provide an independent
proof of our 2 player result in their online addendum.
21Our findings can, nevertheless, be used to demonstrate that the perfect monitoring FT with pure strate-
gies is behaviorally robust to almost-perfect almost-public private monitoring (using similar arguments asso-
ciated with Theorem 6 of MO). This requires (i) verifying that the strategy we use in the proof of our pure
FT is patiently pseudo-strict, which follows easily from our analysis in Sections A.1.3 (two players) and A.2.2
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before, an important feature of bounded memory/recall formulation, in contrast to the finite
automaton approach, is that the players do not have any flexibility as to which part of the
past information they can retain. In particular, in this formulation at any stage, information
from the distant past is permanently erased or lost. Time-dependence, on the other hand,
always requires keeping track of the beginning of time. Thus, if the time index is a part
of past information, time-dependence seems inconsistent with the bounded memory/recall
formulation.22 Hence, within the bounded memory/recall approach of this paper, the dis-
pensability of using time index as a coordination device provides an important additional
robustness check for the FT.
3 Notation and Definitions
The stage game: A normal form game G is defined by G =
(
N, (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N
)
, where
N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of players, Ai is the set of player i’s actions and ui :
∏
j∈N Aj →
R is player i’s payoff function. We assume that Ai is finite and |Ai| ≥ 2 for all i ∈ N , where
|Ai| denotes the cardinality of Ai.
Let A =
∏
i∈N Ai and A−i =
∏
j 6=iAi. We enumerate the set of action profiles by
A = {a1, . . . , a|A|}. We shall denote the maximum payoff in absolute value some player can
obtain by B = maxi∈N maxa∈A |ui(a)|.
The set of mixed action of player i ∈ N is denoted by ∆i. As above, we let ∆ =
∏
i∈N ∆i
and ∆−i =
∏
j 6=i ∆i. For each i ∈ N , the mixed extension of player i’s payoff function is also
denoted by ui.
For any i ∈ N denote, respectively, the pure minmax payoff and a pure minmax profile
(more than two players); and (ii) observing that the equilibrium we construct satisfies the property that the
fraction of time the profile spends in a state at which some player has multiple myopic best responses arise
is arbitrarily small.
22A time-dependent strategy may of course be implementable as finite automata (for example the equilib-
rium strategies in MO are indeed described by finite automata). Furthermore, the inconsistency described
above does not arise within the finite automaton approach, because here the players have the flexibility of
retaining any finite piece of information at any time.
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for player i by vi = mina−i∈A−i maxai∈Ai ui(ai, a−i) and m
i ∈ A, where
mi−i ∈ arg min
a−i∈A−i
max
ai∈Ai
ui(ai, a−i) and mii ∈ arg max
ai∈Ai
ui(ai,m
i
−i).
If G is a 2-player game, a pure mutual minmax profile is m¯ = (m21,m
1
2) ∈ A.
Let U = {u ∈ co (u(A)) : ui ≥ vi for all i ∈ N} denote the set of pure individually rational
payoffs and U0 = {u ∈ co(u(A)) : ui > vi for all i ∈ N}.
Similar definitions apply to the case of mixed strategies. For any i ∈ N denote, re-
spectively, the mixed minmax payoff and a mixed minmax profile for player i by v˜i =
minσ−i∈∆−i maxai∈Ai ui(ai, σ−i) and µ
i ∈ ∆, where µi−i ∈ arg minσ−i∈∆−i maxai∈Ai ui(ai, a−i)
and µii ∈ arg maxai∈Ai ui(ai, µi−i).
Let U˜ = {u ∈ co (u(A)) : ui ≥ v˜i for all i ∈ N} denote the set of mixed individually ra-
tional payoffs and U˜0 = {u ∈ co(u(A)) : ui > v˜i for all i ∈ N}.
The repeated game: The infinitely repeated game consists of an infinite sequence of
repetitions of G. We denote the action of any player i in the repeated game at any date
t = 1, 2, 3, . . . by ati ∈ Ai . Also, let at = (at1, . . . , atn) be the profile of choices at t.
For any t ≥ 1, a t-stage history is a sequence h = (a1, . . . , at) ∈ At (the t-fold Cartesian
product of A). The set of all t -stage histories is denoted by Ht = A
t. We represent the
initial (empty) history by H0. The set of all histories is defined by H =
⋃
t∈N0 Ht.
23 We also
denote the length of any history h ∈ H by `(h).
Let Π = A× A× · · · = A∞ be the set of (infinite) outcome paths in the repeated game.
For any a ∈ A and k ∈ N, we denote a finite path consisting of a being played k times
consecutively by (a; k). Also, for two positive length histories h = (a1, . . . , a`(h)) and h¯ =
(a¯1, . . . , a¯`(h¯)) inH we define the concatenation of h and h¯ by h·h¯ = (a1, . . . , a`(h), a¯1, . . . , a¯`(h¯)).
For any non-empty history h = (a1, . . . , a`(h)) ∈ H and any integer m, define the m-tail
of h by Tm(h) = (amax{`(h)−m+1,1}, . . . , a`(h)). We also adopt the convention that T 0(h) is
the empty history. For all h ∈ H and all k ∈ N with k ≤ `(h), let Bk(h) = (a1, . . . , a`(h)−k)
denote the history obtained from h by removing the last k actions.
For all i ∈ N , a pure strategy for player i is a function fi : H → Ai mapping histories
into pure actions. The set of player i’s strategies is denoted by F pi , and F
p =
∏
i∈N F
p
i with
23We use N0 and N to denote, respectively, the set of non-negative and positive integers.
14
a typical element f = (f1, . . . , fn). Given a strategy fi ∈ F pi and a history h ∈ H, we denote
the strategy induced by fi at h by fi|h. Thus, (fi|h)(h¯) = fi(h · h¯) for every h¯ ∈ H. We will
use (f |h) to denote (f1|h, . . . , fn|h) for every f = (f1, . . . , fn) ∈ F p and h ∈ H.
Any strategy profile f ∈ F p induces an outcome path pi(f) = {pi1(f), pi2(f), . . .} ∈ Π
where pi1(f) = f(H0) and pi
t(f) = f(pi1(f), . . . , pit−1(f)) for any t > 1.
We assume that all players discount the future payoffs by a common discount factor δ ∈
(0, 1). Thus, the payoff in the repeated game is given by Ui(f, δ) = (1−δ)
∑∞
t=1 δ
t−1ui(pit(f)).
For any pi ∈ Π, t ∈ N, and i ∈ N , let V ti (pi, δ) = (1− δ)
∑∞
r=t δ
r−tui(pir) be the continuation
payoff of player i at date t if the outcome path pi is played. For simplicity, we write Vi(pi, δ)
instead of V 1i (pi, δ). Also, when the meaning is clear we shall not explicitly mention δ and
refer to Ui(f, δ), V
t
i (pi, δ) and Vi(pi, δ) by Ui(f), V
t
i (pi) and Vi(pi) respectively.
We also consider the case where players may choose mixed actions but observe only the
realization of those mixed actions. For all i ∈ N , with some abuse of notation, we denote
such a behavior strategy (also referred to as mixed strategy in this paper) for player i by a
function fi : H → ∆i mapping histories into mixed actions. The set of player i’s strategies
is denoted by Fmi , and F
m =
∏
i∈N F
m
i .
Given a strategy fi ∈ Fmi and a history h ∈ H, the strategy induced by fi at h is defined
analogously as in the pure case and also denoted by fi|h.
A behavior strategy f ∈ Fm induces, for every period t ∈ N, a probability distribution
p˜it(f) over pure actions and a probability distribution Pf,t over Ht as follows: p˜i
1(f)[a] =
Pf,1(a) = f(H0)[a] for all a ∈ A = H1 and, for any t > 1, h ∈ Ht and a ∈ A, letting h = h¯ · a¯
with h¯ ∈ Ht−1, Pf,t(h) = Pf,t−1(h)f(h¯)[a¯] and p˜it(f)[a] =
∑
h∈Ht:T 1(h)=a Pf,t(h). Given a
common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1), repeated game payoff of i when f ∈ Fm is chosen is still
denoted by Ui(f, δ) = (1− δ)
∑∞
t=1 δ
t−1∑
a∈A ui(a)p˜i
t(f)[a] for all i ∈ N (when the meaning
is clear we will refer to repeated game payoff by Ui(f) without an explicit reference to δ).
We denote the repeated game described above for discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1) by G∞p (δ) if
only pure actions are allowed and by G∞m (δ) if mixed actions are allowed. Fix any q ∈ {m, p}.
A strategy vector f ∈ F q is a Nash equilibrium of G∞q (δ) if Ui(f) ≥ Ui(fˆi, f−i) for all i ∈ N
and fˆi ∈ F qi . Also, f ∈ F q is a SPE of G∞q (δ) if f |h is a Nash equilibrium for all h ∈ H.
For all M ∈ N, we say that f ∈ F q is a M-memory strategy if f(h) = f(h¯) for all h, h¯ ∈ H
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such that TM(h) = TM(h¯). A strategy profile f ∈ F q is a M-memory SPE of G∞q (δ) if f is
a M -memory strategy and a SPE of G∞q (δ).
4 Bounded memory Folk Theorem with pure strategies
In this section we restrict the analysis to the case of pure strategies. Our FT result for this
case is the following:
Theorem 1 Let G be a n-player game and suppose that either the interior of U in Rn is
non-empty or n = 2 and U0 6= ∅. Then, for all ε > 0, there exists M ∈ N and δ∗ ∈ (0, 1)
such that, for all u ∈ U and δ ≥ δ∗, there exists a M-memory pure SPE f ∈ F p of G∞p (δ)
such that ‖U(f, δ)− u‖ < ε.24
As we explained in the introduction, with finite action spaces, bounded memory and no
randomization, the set of individually rational payoffs can at best be implemented approx-
imately. As a result, in the above FT, the size of the memory M needed depends on the
degree of approximation ε. However, note that M is independent of the individual rational
payoff u that is being implemented and the discount factor δ.
We next provide an intuition for the proof of Theorem 1. The proof itself can be found
in Appendix A.
4.1 Intuition for the 2-player case
In 2-player games, the standard FT construction for sustaining an individually rational payoff
vector u ∈ U as a SPE is a simple (pure) strategy profile that has the following structure:
(i) it has an equilibrium path pi that induces u and (ii) a common punishment path that
starts with a punishment phase consisting of playing the mutual minmax m¯ for some finite
number of time T and then plays the equilibrium path pi (see Mailath and Samuelson (2006,
Proposition 3.3.1, p. 77)).
Our FT construction with bounded memory involves modifying the above standard con-
struction to deal with the issues that bounded memory raises. As illustrated by the examples
24The non-emptiness of the interior of U in Rn implies the NEU condition used in Abreu, Dutta, and
Smith (1994). In the proof we actually use the NEU condition.
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in the Introduction, the identification of the ongoing path and whether or not there has been
a single player deviation can be difficult with bounded memory. This implies that the equilib-
rium path and the punishment path need to be chosen carefully so that the above problems
can be overcome when players observe only a fixed window of past outcomes. This issue
will be dealt with by designing the equilibrium cycle appropriately. The key idea is to in-
sert a signalling sequence of actions regularly in the equilibrium path. The purpose of this
signalling sequence is that, once players have observed it, they can infer that the play is in
the equilibrium path and can, therefore, ignore the part of the history that has occurred
before. For such identification to be both possible and immune to single player deviations,
the following must hold: the signalling sequence of actions must appear infinitely often on
the equilibrium path, it should not appear anywhere else and no single player deviation,
either from the equilibrium path or from the punishment path, should be able to escape the
punishment phase.
Specifically, our construction of the bounded memory equilibrium strategy is as follows.
Since the discount factor is close to 1, for any path, changing the order by which actions are
played has an insignificant impact on the payoffs the players receive. Therefore, to approx-
imately implement the desired payoff profile u, all that matters is that each action profile
is played a fraction of times sufficiently close to its coefficient in the convex combination of
stage game payoffs yielding u. This irrelevance of the order allows us to define the equilib-
rium path pi = {pi1, pi2, . . .} as the repetition of the cycle ((a1; p1), . . . , (a|A|; p|A|)) of length
K =
∑|A|
j=1 p
j,25 where, (i) a1 is chosen to be such that it differs from the mutual minmax
profile m¯ in every coordinate (i.e. a1i 6= m¯i for all i), a2 is set to equal m¯ and all remaining
actions are ordered arbitrarily; (ii) p1 ≥ 2 and p2 ≥ 1; and (iii) pj/K is close to the coefficient
of u(aj) in the convex combination yielding u, for all j = 1, . . . , r.
The M -memory strategy profile that implements the above path can then be described
as follows (see condition (18) in the Appendix for a formal definition): It begins at any date
t < p1 by playing the equilibrium action pit = a1 if no deviation from the equilibrium path
(pi1, . . . , pit−1) = (a1; t−1) has occurred. It continues with playing the equilibrium path after
25Recall that A = {a1, . . . , a|A|} and (a; k) denotes the history consisting of the play of action profile a for
k consecutive periods.
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any history of length greater or equal to p1 if the M -tail of the history either contains p1
consecutive occurrences of a1 followed by the subsequent actions of the equilibrium path (if
any) or consists of M − t consecutive occurrences of m¯ followed by the first t actions of the
equilibrium cycle, for some t = 0, 1, . . . , p1 − 1. At any other history, the strategy profile
prescribes playing m¯.26
In this construction the sequence (a1; p1) at the beginning of the equilibrium cycle is the
required signalling phase described above. It appears infinitely often on the equilibrium path
and it differs from the action profile m¯ that is played during the punishment phase in every
component.
To implement the equilibrium path by simply observing the first p1 period of the path,
the size of the memory has to be no less than the sum of K, the length of the equilibrium
cycle, and p1, the length of the signalling phase. Furthermore, since with the above strategy
profile, deviations from the equilibrium path induce mutual minmax for M periods, we must
also have M ≥ T , the length of mutual minmax phase needed to deter deviations. Therefore,
to obtain our result, the bound on the memory M needs to be no less than max{K + p1, T}.
Finally, the above construction is such that no single player deviation, either from the
equilibrium path or from the punishment path, can escape the punishment phase. To see
this, note first that because a1i 6= m¯i, for all i = 1, 2, no single player can deviate from
the mutual minmaxing phase and induce the signalling phase that is necessary to escape
punishment. The same holds also regarding deviations from histories whose M -tail consists
of M − t consecutive occurrences of m¯ followed by the first t actions of the equilibrium cycle,
for some t < p1, because a player deviating singly from a1 will lead to an action different
from both a1 and m¯. Last, consider any single-player deviation from the equilibrium path.
Such a deviation does not result in a punishment phase only if the M -tail of the history after
the deviation either contains p1 consecutive occurrences of a1 followed by the subsequent
actions of the equilibrium path (if any) or, for some t < p1, consists of M − t consecutive
occurrences of m¯ followed by the first t actions of the equilibrium cycle. The latter cannot
26Note that the above strategy profile does not satisfy Abreu’s definition of simple strategy. This is because
the punishment path is not unique: the number of times the mutual minmax action is to be played in response
to a deviation depends on the number of times the mutual minmax appears before the punishment starts.
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happen because the M -tail does not contain p1 consecutive a1’s and hence the deviation
could not be from the equilibrium path. Consider then the former case. In this case such
a deviation is feasible only if the p1-tail is (a1; p1). Since p1 ≥ 2, both the action profile
induced by the deviation and the action profile just before the deviation must be a1. But,
on the equilibrium path, only a1 or m¯ follow a1. Since the deviation induces a1, then it must
be that the deviation is from m¯. But m¯ differs from a1 in every coordinate, which implies
that single-player deviation cannot produce such a history.
To illustrate our construction and explain why the assumption of p1 ≥ 2 and p2 ≥ 1
cannot be weakened, consider the repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma described in the intro-
duction (for example, with payoffs as described in footnote 8) and suppose that we want
to construct a SPE with bounded memory that induces the payoffs that approximates
the payoffs corresponding to playing the cycle ((C,D), (D,C)) forever. Since in this ex-
ample m¯ = (D,D) and the profile that differs from m¯ in every component is (C,C),
our construction would then involve considering equilibrium strategies that play the cy-
cle {((C,C); p1), ((D,D); p2), ((C,D); `), ((D,C); `)} repeatedly on the equilibrium path, for
some p1 ≥ 2, p2 ≥ 1 and `, and punish any deviation by playing (D,D) for M times followed
by a return to the equilibrium path. For sufficiently large `, relative to p1 and p2, such a
bounded strategy profile results in (C,D) and (D,C) being played almost all the time and
in equal proportion on the equilibrium path.
In the above construction any p1 ≥ 2 and p2 ≥ 1 will suffice to achieve bounded
memory SPE implementation. To see why p2 has to be positive, suppose that p1 = 2,
p2 = 0. Then, the signalling phase is ((C,C); 2) and the equilibrium cycle consists of just
(((C,C); 2), ((C,D); `), ((D,C); `)). This implies that if the M -tail of a history is given by
(a1, . . . , aM−2, (C,C), (C,C)) for some sequence of action profiles a1, . . . , aM−2, then the sig-
nalling phase ((C,C); 2) is observed and the players should play (C,D). But if player 2
deviates and plays C at this history, the next period M -tail of the resulting history would
be (a2, . . . aM−2, (C,C), (C,C), (C,C)). Since the signaling phase is observed again, such
deviation does not trigger the punishment path.
To see why we need p1 to be no less than 2, suppose that the equilibrium cycle is such
that p1 = p2 = 1. Then the strategy profile recommends (C,D) at any history whose M -
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tail equals (a1, . . . , aM−2, (C,C), (D,D)), for some a1, . . . , aM−2. But if player 2 deviates at
this history and plays C instead, the next period M -tail of the resulting history would be
(a2, . . . , aM−2, (C,C), (D,D), (C,C)). Since this history induces the signalling phase (C,C),
such a deviation does not trigger the punishment path.
4.2 Intuition for the n > 2 case
With no bounds on memory and more than two players, to implement u ∈ U the standard
FT calls for the use of a simple (pure) strategy consisting of an equilibrium path pi(0) and
n punishment paths pi(1), . . . , pi(n) with the following property. The punishment path pi(i)
for player i consists of playing the minmax profile mi for T periods followed by a path pˆi(i),
referred to as the reward path corresponding to pi(i); thus
pi(i),t =
 mi if t ≤ Tpˆi(i),t−T otherwise.
Therefore, the typical FT construction consists of three sets of sequences of action profiles:
(i) the equilibrium path pi(0), (ii) the minmax phase for each player i consisting of playing
mi a finite number of times T , and (iii) the reward paths pˆi(i) for each i. For convenience,
we let pˆi(i) denote the equilibrium path when i = 0.
As in the above standard construction, the bounded memory strategy profiles we use
to prove our FT are such that the incentives to play the equilibrium and reward paths are
given by the threat of punishments, consisting of a sequence of the deviator’s minmax action
profile followed by the appropriate reward path. However, to identify each of the sequences
described in (i)–(iii) and the appropriate action profile that has to be played, we add to the
beginning of each of the above sequences a distinct signalling phase. As with the 2-player
case, once players observe one of these signalling phases, they can identify what needs to be
played and, therefore, can forget all that has happened before.
For example, each signalling phase could consist of a sequence (s; l) where s ∈ A is some
fixed action profile and l is some number that is different for the different signalling phases.
The idea is that when players observe a sequence of the form (s; l) then, by counting the
number of consecutive s’s, which equals l in this sequence, they can identify the path to play.
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The above, however, may not work as the players need to identify when the signalling
phase starts and when it ends. Specifically, if (s; l) is observed then the history is consistent
with any signalling phase (s; l′) for all l′ ≤ l. To overcome this, we modify each signalling
phase (s; l) so that it is preceded and followed by another action, s′ 6= s.
The addition of s′ to the signalling phases is also not enough. First, we need to ensure that
each signalling phase cannot be induced by single player deviations from another signalling
phase. We deal with this problem by choosing s′ to be such that it differs from s in every
coordinate (i.e. si 6= s′i for all i ∈ N). Second, for reasons that will become clear later,
we also need to assume that each signalling phase starts with two s′’s and has at least
two consecutive s’s. Specifically, each signalling phase in our construction is described by
(s′, s′, (s; l), s′) and we set l in each phase as follows: l = i+ 1 for the minmax path of player
i, l = n+ 2 for the equilibrium path and l = n+ 2 + i for the reward path of player i.
As we discussed before, with δ close to 1, to approximately implement u ∈ U , all that
matters is that, on the equilibrium path, each action profile is played an appropriate fraction
of times. The same holds for approximately implementing the payoffs corresponding to the
reward paths. It may then seem that the simple strategy profile that we need is as follows:
(i) the equilibrium path pi(0) = (pi(0),1, pi(0),2, . . .) consists of the repetition of the following
type of cycle path
(
s′, s′, (s;n+ 2), s′, (a1, ; p(0),1), . . . , (a|A|; p(0),|A|)
)
;
where p(0),j is chosen appropriately so that pi(0) induce approximately u.
(ii) the reward path pˆi(i) = (pˆi(i),1, pˆi(i),2, . . .), i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, is the repetition of the cycle
(
s′, s′, (s;n+ i+ 2), s′, (a1; p(i),1), . . . , (a|A|; p(i),|A|)
)
;
where p(i),j is chosen appropriately so that pi(i) induce approximately the appropriate reward
payoff.
(iii) the punishment path pi(i), i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, is given by
pi(i) =
(
s′, s′, (s; i+ 1), s′, (mi;T ), pˆi(i),1, pˆi(i),2, . . .
)
,
where T is chosen appropriately to deter single-player deviations.
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Unfortunately, the problem is a great deal more complicated. An immediate issue is that
we must ensure that the introduction of the signalling phases does not affect the incentives
adversely. On all paths other than one’s own punishment path, we can ensure that the
players play the appropriate continuation path by the standard construction that invokes
the punishment for the deviator after any single player deviation from such phases. The
same is, however, not the case regarding the play of one’s own punishment path.
First, once we introduce a signalling phase at the beginning of each punishment path,
some player may have a profitable deviation in the minmax phase of his own punishment,
if such deviation restarts the punishment path. For example, deviation by i at the begin-
ning of the minmax phase of his own punishment path induces the outcome (s′, s′, (s; i +
1), s′, (mi;T ), pˆi(i),1, pˆi(i),2, . . .), whereas no deviation induces ((mi;T − 1), pˆi(i),1, pˆi(i),2, . . .). If
(s′, s′, (s; i + 1), s′) generates a sufficiently high average payoff, then the deviation will be
profitable. To deal with this problem, we modify the above simple strategy construction by
assuming that deviations by a player from his own minmax action in his punishment path
are ignored and the punishment path is not restarted. Such a change in the construction
does not affect the incentives because there are no one-period gains to deviations during the
minmax phase.
Second, some player may profitably deviate in the signalling phase of his own punishment
path if such deviation restarts the signalling phase. For instance, if some player i obtains
a high payoff by deviating from s′ to some action ai, he could perpetually deviate in the
first period of the punishment path and obtain a path consisting in the repetition of (ai, s
′
−i)
delivering him a higher payoff. Similarly, if some player i obtains a high payoff by deviating
from s by playing some action ai, then he could perpetually deviate in the third period of
the punishment path and obtain a path consisting in the repetition of (s′, s′, (ai, s−i)) which
could yield him a higher payoff.
We deal with this problem by specifying that when there is a deviation by a player
in the signalling phase of his punishment path, the strategy prescribes the continuation of
that particular signalling phase. But this by itself is not enough as we need to ensure that
there is punishment to deter deviations during this phase (if s or s′ were Nash equilibria
of the stage game this would, of course, be unnecessary). We establish such deterrence by
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appropriately increasing the length of the minmax phase of the punishment path for each
such deviation. Specifically, denoting the number of times that player i has deviated during
the signalling phase of his punishment path by θ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , i + 4}, the strategy profile
requires that once the current signalling phase is over, the continuation path consists of
playing ((mi; (θ + 1)T ), pˆi(i),1, pˆi(i),2, . . .). Such construction implies that for every deviation
during the signalling phase the length of the minmax phase increases by T .27
The above modification involving delayed punishments of deviations during the signalling
phases of the punishment paths has two implications that are worth noting. First, each player
i effectively has i + 5 punishment paths indexed by θ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , i + 4}.28 We denote each
of these by pi(i)(θ) = (s′, s′, (s; i + 1), s′, (mi; (θ + 1)T ), pˆi(i),1, pˆi(i),2, . . .) and define the path
pi(i)(θ) without its first t− 1 elements by pi(i)(θ, t).
Second, ignoring one-period deviations by any player i during the signalling phases of
i’s punishment path, as proposed above, means that the minmax phase starts after any
sequences
((a1i , s
′
−i), (a
2
i , s
′
−i), (a
3
i , s−i), . . . , (a
i+3
i , s−i), (a
i+4
i , s
′
−i)), (1)
with ali ∈ Ai for all l = 1, . . . , i + 4, has been observed. Therefore, it follows that the
signal for the punishment of player i are effectively all sequences satisfying (1) rather than
just (s′, s′, (s; i + 1), s′). To differentiate between any sequence described in (1) from the
signalling phase (s′, s′, (s; i + 1), s′), we shall call the former a generalized signalling phase
for player i’s punishment path.
Given the above, after any history h = (a1, . . . , aτ ), our M -period memory strategy
profile f would satisfy the following conditions (the formal definition of the strategy is given
in (28) in the Appendix):
(a) (Equilibrium and reward path histories) Suppose the t-tail of h is (pˆi(i),1, . . . , pˆi(i),t),
for some i = 0, . . . , n and t ≤M , and it includes the signalling phase (s′, s′, (s;n+ i+ 2), s′)
27The reason for having θ + 1 instead of just θ is that player i needs to be punished even if he does not
deviate in the signalling phase of his punishment path.
28By the number of punishment paths, we mean the number of distinct paths that a player can induce
by a deviation, excluding the continuation path that occurs when the player does not deviate. Note also
that our construction does not constitute a simple strategy profile because it will have, in addition to the
equilibrium path,
∑n
i=1(i+ 5) punishments paths.
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of pˆi(i), i.e. n+ i+ 5 ≤ t. Then f prescribes players to continue with pˆi(i).
(b) (Punishment path histories) Suppose that, for some i = 1, . . . , n and t such that
i+ 4 ≤ t ≤M , the t-tail of h has the following properties:
(i) the first i + 4 elements of the t-tail is a generalized signalling phase of i as described
in (1);
(ii) if t ≤ (θ+ 1)T + i+ 4, where θ refers to the number of times that player i has deviated
during the signalling phase (1), the remaining elements of the t-tail are such that the
players other than i minmax i by playing mi−i;
(iii) if t > (θ + 1)T + i + 4, in every period i + 4 < r ≤ (θ + 1)T + i + 4 of the t-tail all
players other than i minmax i by playing mi−i, and the remaining elements of the t-tail
correspond to the first t− ((θ + 1)T + i+ 4) elements of the path pˆi(i).
Then f requires the players to continue with pi(i)(θ, t+ 1).
(c) (Histories involving deviations from (a)–(b)) Suppose case (b) does not apply and,
for some r ∈ {τ −M, . . . , τ}, (a1, . . . , ar−1) satisfies the properties described in either (a)
or (b) above, ar involves a deviation by some player i from f as described in (a) and (b),
and (ar+1, . . . , aτ ) is consistent with a generalized signalling phase for player i’s punishment
path. Then f prescribes pi(i)(θ, τ − r+ 1), where θ refers to the number of times that player
i has deviated during (ar+1, . . . , aτ ).
Conditions (a)–(c) describe the behavior after histories that have the following feature:
For some t ≤ M , its t-tail contains the entire signalling phase of one of the equilibrium or
reward path, or an entire generalized signalling phase for a punishment path. In particular,
(a)–(c) specify the appropriate path to be played once these signalling phases are observed
and are followed by a sequence of actions in which there are either no deviations or only
single-player deviations from the path corresponding to the signalling phase.
What if a complete generalized signalling phase does not appear in the M -tail of the
history? The specification of what should be played at such histories cannot be arbitrary as
the equilibrium should be such that it is not in the interest of any player to deviate during a
generalized signalling phase of another player’s punishment path. To deal with this case, we
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assume that if a complete generalized signalling phase does not appear in the M -tail of the
history as in (a)–(c) and if, for some t ≤M , the t-tail of the history consists of a single-player
deviation from s or s′ by player i followed by an incomplete generalized signalling phase for
the punishment of player i, then the strategy recommends players to continue with such
signalling phase. For any other history, our construction prescribes playing the equilibrium
path.29 More formally, in addition to (a)–(c) above, we assume that the equilibrium strategies
satisfy the following two conditions at every history h = (a1, . . . , aτ ):
(d) (Histories that involve deviations from incomplete signalling phases) If none of the
conditions (a)–(c) are satisfied and if for some r ∈ {τ −M, . . . , τ}, ar involves a deviation
by some player i from s or s′ and (ar+1, . . . , aτ ) is consistent with a generalized signalling
phase of player i’s punishment path, then f prescribes pi(i)(θ, τ − r + 1), where θ refers to
the number of times that player i has deviated during (ar+1, . . . , aτ ).30
(e) (Other histories) If none of conditions (a)–(d) are satisfied and the last 0 ≤ t < M
periods corresponds to the first t periods of the equilibrium path pi(0), then the strategy
prescribes players to continue with pi(0) (when t = 0 the strategy recommends the first
action on the equilibrium path).31
To ensure that the above behavior described by (a)–(e) can be implemented when M is
finite, however, several issues have to be addressed.
First, we need to set M to be large enough so that it is possible to distinguish between
the different paths and phases. Specifically, let K be such that all individually rational
29The specification of the continuation path here is somewhat arbitrary; all that is needed is that the play
results in any of the equilibrium, reward or punishment paths.
30Unlike in the case of condition (c), there may be several values for r such that condition (d) holds. For
example, if h satisfies none of the conditions (a)–(c) and T 3(h) = ((a1i , s
′
−i), (a
2
i , s
′
−i), (a
3
i , s
′
−i)) for some
i ∈ N and a1i , a2i , a3i 6= s′i, then condition (d) is satisfied with r = τ , r = τ − 1 and r = τ − 2. In our proof,
we take the smallest such r (in the example in this footnote, f prescribes pi(i)(θ, t) with θ = 2 and t = 3).
31Note that at histories described in (e), it is possible that the path resulting from such a history fails
to be the equilibrium path. For example, suppose that Tn+i+4(h) = (s′, s′, (s;n + i + 2)) for some i ∈ N
and that h does not satisfy (a)–(d). Then the strategy recommends the first action on the equilibrium path
s′. The resulting history, denoted by h′, satisfies Tn+i+5(h′) = (s′, s′, (s;n + i + 2), s′), which equals the
signalling phase of player i’s reward path. At this point, player i’s reward path will be played henceforth.
This, of course, does not generate any problems as the strategy profile still implements a SPE path.
25
payoffs can be approximately obtained by the average payoff of cycle paths of length K.32
Also, note that the length of the longest signalling phase in the different punishment paths,
the length of the longest minmax phase and the length of the longest signalling phase of
the reward paths are respectively n + 4, T (n + 5) and 2n + 5. Then it follows that for
the strategy profile to implement the punishment paths, the memory size has to be at least
(n + 4) + T (n + 5) + (2n + 5) + K. We show in the appendix it suffices to have M greater
than this bound to implement our strategy profile.
Second, even though the signalling phases of the different paths, including the generalized
signalling phases as described by (1), are all different, this does not necessarily imply that,
once they are observed, they can be used to identify the future path of play. For example, if
the signalling phase (s′, s′, (s;n+ i+2), s′) of pˆi(i) appears on pˆi(j), for j 6= i, then the strategy
described above may not be well-defined. Furthermore, for these signalling phases to have
the required property that once they are observed all previous history can be ignored, it
should also be the case that they cannot be induced by a single player deviation from some
other path. For example, if, for some aj 6= s′j, the sequence (s′, s′, (s;n + i + 2), (aj, s′−j))
appears on the reward path pˆi(j), then there may be an incentive for j to play s′j on the path
pˆi(j) after (s′, s′, (s;n+ i+ 2)), as such a deviation induces the signalling phase of pˆi(i).
The issue here is that we not only need the signalling phases to be distinct from each
other, they also need to be appropriately distinct with respect to the equilibrium and reward
paths, as well as with respect to minmax phases. We deal with these issues as follows.
By the same argument as before, the order by which the sequence of actions {a1, . . . , a|A|}
is played on the equilibrium path and on each of the reward paths, as well as the number of
times they are played on the path, do not matter as long as each action profile is played an
appropriate fraction of times. This freedom to choose the order of the sequence {a1, . . . , a|A|}
allow us to construct the equilibrium and the reward paths in such a way so that they are
appropriately distinct from the signalling phases.
Specifically, we achieve this as follows. The first action profile a1 is set to be equal to s
and is followed by all the action profiles of the form (ai, s−i) for some i ∈ N and ai 6= si.
These are followed by s′, and then by action profiles of the form (ai, s′−i) for some i ∈ N
32Notice that K, and hence M , will depend on the degree of approximation.
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and ai 6= s′i. The remaining action profiles are ordered arbitrarily.33 With this ordering, on
the equilibrium and reward paths, s′ and action profiles obtained by single player deviations
from s′ are never followed by s or by action profiles consisting of single player deviations
from s, other than in the initial signalling phases. This ordering ensures that (i) for each
i = 0, . . . , n, the signalling phase of pˆi(i) appears only once on the cycle path of pˆi(i) and it does
not appear on pˆi(j), for all j 6= i, (ii) the generalized signalling phase for each punishment
path does not appear on pˆi(j), for all j = 0, . . . , n and (iii) no signalling phase can be induced
from single player deviations from pˆi(j), for all j = 0, . . . , n.
There is still the issue of appropriate distinctness of the signalling phases from the min-
max ones. Since the signalling phases consist of two action profiles s and s′ that are distinct
in every component, it follows trivially that the signalling phases, including the generalized
ones, cannot occur when all players are minmaxing a specific player and, furthermore, the
former sequences cannot be induced by single player deviations from a minmax phase. How-
ever, in our construction, we assume that a deviation by any player i from his minmax profile
mi is ignored and the future play is not affected by such a deviation. This means that we
must also ensure that signalling phase, including the generalized ones, cannot be induced by
single player deviations from sequences ((a1i ,m−i), . . . , (a
τ
i ,m−i)) that involve single player
deviations by player i from his own minmax phase. Our requirement that each signalling
phase contains at least two consecutive s′’s and two consecutive s’s at the beginning of these
phases deals with this issue.
To see the role of at least two consecutive s’s in the signalling phases, suppose that instead
of assuming that the signalling phases of the punishment path of each i has i+1 consecutive
s’s, we have i consecutive s’s. This means that the signalling phase of player i’s punishment
is given by (s′, s′, (s; i), s′). Consider then a 3-player game with m3 = (s3, s′−3), a history
h = ((s′; 2), (s; 3), s′, s′, s′, (s′1, s−1), s
′) and M ≥ 10. Since s′ = (s′3, ,m3−3), (s′1, s−1) =
(s2,m
3
−2) and the signalling phase for player i’s punishment is ((s
′; 2), (s; i), s′), it follows
that h consists of the signalling phase for player 3’s punishment, followed by (s′3,m
3
−3) being
33For example, when n = 3 and Ai = {α, β} for all i ∈ N , a possible ordering respecting the above
properties would be a1 = s = (α, α, α), a2 = (β, α, α), a3 = (α, β, α), a4 = (α, α, β), a5 = s′ = (β, β, β),
a6 = (α, β, β), a7 = (β, α, β) , a8 = (β, β, α).
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played twice, followed by (s2,m
3
−2) and followed by s
′, the first action of the signalling phase
of player 2’s punishment path. Hence, by part (c) of our construction above, the strategy
prescribes continuing with punishing player 2 by playing
(
(s; 2), s′, (m2;T ), pˆi(2),1, pˆi(2),2, . . .
)
.
But T 4(h) = ((s′; 2), (s′1, s−1), s
′) is a generalized signalling phase of player 1’s punishment.
Thus, part (b) of our construction also applies. Therefore, the strategy also recommends(
(m1; 2T ), pˆi(1),1, pˆi(1),2, . . .
)
.
The problem here arises because s′ = (s′3,m
3
−3) and (s
′
1, s−1) = (s2,m
3
−2). Hence, single-
player deviations from m3 can induce both s′ and single-player deviations from s, and, as a
result, the continuation strategy after history h is not well-defined.
Having s played i + 1 times in the signalling phase of i’s punishment solves the above
problem as follows. In this case the signalling phase of player 1 is (s′, s′, (s; 2), s′). This means
that if player 1 deviates from s during his signalling phase this is preceded and succeeded
by s and s′ or the reverse. Since it cannot be the case that both s and s′ can be induced by
a player deviating from his own minmax profile, it follows that deviations by player 1 from
his own signalling phase are not consistent with phases involving another player deviating
from his own minmax phase. Hence, the problem described above does not arise.
Similarly, to see the role of having two consecutive s′’s at the beginning of the signalling
phases, suppose that instead of assuming that the signalling phases of the punishment path
of each i is (s′, s′, (s; i + 1), s′), we assume that it consists of (s′, (s; i + 1), s′) with only one
s′ at the beginning of these phases. Consider a 3-player game with m1 = (s′1, s−1), a history
h = (s′, (s; 2), s′, (s; 3), (s2, s′−2)) and M ≥ 8. Since s = (s1,m1−1), (s2, s′−2) = (s′3,m1−3) and
the signalling phase for player i’s punishment is (s′, (s; i + 1), s′), it follows that h consists
of the signalling phase for player 1’s punishment, followed by (s1,m
1
−1) being played three
times, followed by (s′3,m
1
−3). Hence, by part (c) of our construction above, the strategy
prescribes pi(3). But T 5(h) = (s′, (s; 3), (s2, s′−2)) is a generalized signalling phase of player
2’s punishment. Thus, part (b) of our construction also applies. Therefore, the strategy also
recommends
(
(m2; 2T ), pˆi(2),1, pˆi(2),2, . . .
)
.
The problem here arises because s = (s1,m
1
−1) and (s2, s
′
−2) = (s
′
3,m
1
−3). Hence, single-
player deviations from m1 can induce both s and single-player deviations from s′; as a result,
the continuation strategy after history h is not well-defined.
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Having two s′’s at the beginning of the signalling phases solves this problem. Then the
signalling phase of player 2 would be ((s′; 2), (s; 3), s′). But such phase is consistent with
the signalling phase of player 1 followed by 1’s minmax phase only if both s and s′ could be
induced by player 1 deviating from his own minmax profile.34 Since s and s′ are distinct in
every component, this is not feasible, hence, the problem described above does not arise.
4.3 Comparing the proof for n > 2 to n = 2
Before concluding the discussion of the proof of Theorem 1, note that the proof of the
Theorem for the n = 2 case cannot be applied to n > 2 case because the common punishment
(involving mutual minmaxing) used in the former cannot be applied to the latter. Also, with
bounded memory, a common punishment may be necessary to prove a FT result when n = 2
because it is not always possible to detect the identity of a deviator in a two player settings.35
Hence, our proof for n > 2 case also cannot be applied to n = 2 case because the former
uses a separate punishment for each player.
5 Bounded memory Folk Theorem with mixed strate-
gies
The set of mixed individually rational payoffs U˜ contains that with pure strategies U . This
section demonstrates that the bounded memory FT holds for U˜ in the case of three or more
players who can choose behavioral strategies.
Theorem 2 Suppose that n > 2 and the interior of U in Rn is non-empty. Then, for all
ε > 0, there exist δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that, for all u ∈ U˜ and δ ≥ δ∗, there exists M ∈ N and a
34This is because in this case the number of s′’s at the beginning of the signalling phase of player 2 is
different from that at the end of the signalling phase of player 1.
35For example, since in the proof of the n > 2 case the signalling phase of the punishment phases of
players 1 and 2 are respectively (s′, s′, (s; 2), s′) and (s′, s′, (s; 3), s′) it follows that if the proof is applied to
the n = 2 case, then when the history under consideration is given by (s′, s′, (s; 2), (s′1, s2)), it is not clear if
2 has deviated from the signalling phase of the punishment path of 1 or if 1 has deviated from the signalling
phase of the punishment path of 2.
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M-memory behavior SPE f ∈ Fm of G∞m (δ) such that ‖U(f, δ)− u‖ < ε.36
The proof can be found in Appendix B. In the rest of the section, we discuss the additional
difficulties that arise in establishing our mixed bounded memory FT and provide an intuition
for the method we use to overcome these difficulties, and thereby, to prove the result.
With or without restrictions on memory, the key difficulty in showing a mixed FT as
compared with a pure FT is to provide incentives so that, in the minmax phase of a given
player i, all players other than i play their part of i’s mixed minmax action profile. The
standard proof of the unbounded memory mixed FT is that of Fudenberg and Maskin (1991).
They solve the problem by making each player j 6= i indifferent between all the actions in the
support of his part of i’s mixed minmax action profile. In turn, this indifference is achieved
by making the continuation payoff that occurs after the minmax phase dependent on the
sequence of (pure) action profiles that were actually played in the minmax phase.
Fudenberg and Maskin (1991)’s approach of making each player j 6= i exactly indifferent
by adjusting future continuation payoffs appropriately works because any feasible payoff can
be exactly implemented by some strategy profile. But with bounded memory restrictions
this is not possible as feasible payoffs can, in general, only be approximately implemented.
For this reason, we use an alternative approach based on Gossner (1995).
In Gossner’s (1995) approach, the construction of the equilibrium strategy profile is
similar to that in Fudenberg and Maskin (1991) except that the punishment path for any
player i is such that the minmax phase for i involves playing action profiles that approximately
minmax player i for a finite number of periods T , and the reward phase following the minmax
phase involve random reward paths that reward other players if they have approximately
minmaxed player i during i’s minmax phase. Specifically, at the end of the minmax phase
of player i a statistical test is performed to determine whether or not each of the other
players have played sufficiently close to their part of i’s minmax. For each player other than
i, passing the test yield him a higher continuation payoff than the one he obtains if he fails
the test, thus providing incentives to pass the test. Furthermore, the test is constructed to
36If the interior of U in Rn is non-empty, then so is the interior of U˜ in Rn. However, the converse does
not hold. Theorem 2 also holds if the interior of U˜ in Rn is non-empty and maxa∈A ui(a) > vi for all i. For
more, see footnote 41.
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have the following two properties. First, each player other than i passes it with probability
arbitrarily close to 1 if he plays his part of i’s minmax in each period of the minmax phase.
Second, i’s payoff in his minmax phase is close to his minmax payoff whenever all other
players pass the test. Thus, in summary, while it may not be optimal for all players other
than i to play their part of i’s minmax in each period of i’s minmax phase, these players will
play in such a way that each of them will pass the statistical test with a probability close
to one and player i’s payoff in his minmax phase will be close to his minmax payoff with a
probability also close to one.
To obtain a mixed bounded memory FT, we modify the construction for pure strategies in
the previous section so that the minmax phase and the reward phase are as in Gossner (1995).
This modification, however, introduces a number of difficulties and new issues because of the
finite memory restriction and discounting.37
First, in our pure strategy FT the length of the minmax phase T was chosen independently
of δ. When the minmax phase and the reward phase are modified as in Gossner (1995),
however, we cannot ensure that this is the case, or more generally that limδ→1 δT = 1. Since
the memory needed to implement the strategy profile has to exceed T , this in turn implies,
in contrast to the result with pure strategies, that the minimum memory needed to obtain
a mixed FT is no longer uniform in δ.
The length of the minmax phase T cannot be chosen independently of δ because the
set of feasible payoffs cannot, in general, be exactly implemented with bounded memory
and because with the modification the continuation payoff in the reward phases depends
on the outcome of the statistical test that is conducted at the end of the minmax phases.
Specifically, these two features create difficulties in providing incentives for each player i ∈ N
in the reward paths that follow i’s minmax phase if T does not depend on δ. To see this,
note first that the statistical test after the minmax phase makes the reward path following
the minmax phase random and not unique. Let ui and u¯i be, respectively, player i’s lowest
and highest reward payoff after i’s minmax phase, and let ζ > 0 be the probability that u¯i
is the reward payoff. Assuming that any deviation by i from his reward phase is followed by
a punishment path that consist of a minmax phase of T periods for i followed by a random
37Gossner’s (1995) mixed FT result is for the case of finitely repeated game with no discounting.
31
reward path that depend on the outcome of the test (in the proof, the punishment also
involves an initial signalling phase; but to simplify the discussion here we will ignore these
signalling phases in the computation below), the lowest reward payoff ui must then satisfy
the following incentive condition:
ui ≥ (1− δ)Bi + (1− δ)
T∑
t=1
δtv˜ti + δ
T+1(ζu¯i + (1− ζ)ui)
= (1− δ)Bi + (1− δ)
T∑
t=1
δtv˜ti + δ
T+1(ui + ζϕ).
(2)
where Bi denotes the maximum payoff from one period deviation, v˜
t
i denotes i’s expected
payoff in period t of his minmax phase and ϕ = u¯i− ui ≥ 0. But if T is independent of δ, or
more generally if limδ→1 δT = 1, the limit of the right hand side of (2) is ui + ζϕ as δ goes
to 1. Hence (2), may fail to hold for sufficiently large δ if ζ and ϕ do not vanish.
But ζ is determined by the probability that players other than i pass the test after T
periods, and hence, for any finite T , it is positive even as δ → 1. Also, for any fixed memory
size we cannot ensure that player i receives the same payoff in all reward phases that follow
his minmax phase even as δ → 1, i.e. we cannot ensure that ϕ vanishes. This is because these
reward phases are chosen to incentivize other players to (approximately) minmax player i
during i’s minmax phase, hence, they involve different payoffs for other players depending
on whether they pass the tests or not. Given the need for inducing different payoffs for the
other players and given that with a fixed memory it is not feasible to implement all feasible
payoffs exactly, it follows that we cannot guarantee that i’s continuation payoff is exactly
the same in all the reward phases following i’s minmax phase for any fixed memory.38
To solve the above problem, we will allow for limδ→1 δT to be less than 1 and ensure (2) as
follows: Since ui is individually rational, choose ε > 0 such that ui > v˜i+ε. Then, by making
the statistical test sufficiently stringent, we have that (1 − δT )(v˜i + ε) > (1 − δ)
∑T
t=1 δ
tv˜ti .
38The above problem arises because with finite memory one can not implement any arbitrary feasible
payoff exactly. We can, of course, make ϕ vanish by letting the memory size become arbitrary large and
then let δ go to 1. However, there is no guarantee that by taking the double limit one can find a sufficiently
large memory size M and a sufficiently large discount factor δ such that ϕ is small enough for (2) to hold.
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Then it follows that we can fix c ∈ (0, 1) such that
ui > (1− c)(v˜i + ε) + cui. (3)
Next choose any ϕ > 0 sufficiently small so that
ui > (1− c)(v˜i + ε) + c(ui + ϕ). (4)
Finally, choose t(δ) such that limδ→1 δt(δ) = c and set T = t(δ); then it follows from (4) that
we can find δ¯ sufficiently close to 1 so that (2) holds for all δ ≥ δ¯.39
The second difficulty in using Gossner’s (1995) approach in our setting involves ensuring
that in player i’s minmax phase each player j 6= i passes the test with probability arbitrarily
close to 1 provided that he plays his part of i’s minmax in each period. Gossner (1995)’s
setup with no discounting allows him to use Blackwell’s (1956) approachability results to
establish such result. The Blackwell’s (1956) approachability result could be used in our
setting with discounted payoff provided that T could be chosen independently of δ. Since
for reasons explained before, we assume that T depends on δ such that limδ→1 δt(δ) < 1, we
cannot appeal to Blackwell’s (1956)’s approachability results to show that each j 6= i passes
his statistical test with a probability close to 1 by playing his part of i’s minmax in each
period of i’s minmax phase. Instead, we use McDiarmid’s (1998) concentration results to
establish the same conclusion in our setting.40
The third difficulty in using Gossner’s (1995) approach in our setting arises because
players may randomize during the minmax phases. This implies that some of the signalling
phases may occur during the minmax phase (this possibility could not occur in the construc-
tion with pure strategies because in this case the minmax phase involves playing the same
action profile a finite number of periods whereas the signalling phase involves playing the
sequence of action profiles (s′, s′, (s; l), s′) for some l with s′i 6= si for all i ∈ N). To avoid
39While condition (2) is satisfied as long as limδ→1 δt(δ) ∈ (0, 1), in the proof of Theorem 2, we assume that
this limit is close to 1. We make this additional assumption in order to ensure that each player (a) prefers
to punish than to be punished (condition (45) in the proof) and (b) finds it optimal to pass the statistical
test in another player’s minmax phase with a sufficiently high probability (condition (44) in the proof).
40See Carmona and Sabourian (2014) for more details and an approachability results for the discounting
case.
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this difficulty we modify the strategy profile so that whenever the sequence of actions played
during i’s minmax phase is such that a signalling sequence is “close” to happen, then all
players other than i take actions to prevent such signalling sequence to occur. For example,
if the signalling sequence is (s′, s′, (s; i + 1), s′) then every j takes an action s′j if the last
i + 1 action profiles are (s′, s′, (s; i − 1)). While this specification of the strategy prevents
signalling phases to occur during the minmax phases of any player i, it implies, in contrast
with Gossner (1995), that players may not play “close” to i’s minmax after some histories.
This creates two potential issues that need to be dealt with. First, if such histories occur
too frequently, then there is no guarantee that i’s payoff in his minmax phase is close to
his minmax payoff whenever all other players pass their statistical tests. To prevent such
histories to occur frequently (more precisely, to make the fraction of times that such his-
tories occur during the T periods of minmaxing sufficiently small), we make the signalling
sequences sufficiently long by assuming that the signalling phase of player i’s minmax phase
is ((s′; 2), (s,Q+ i+ 1), s′) for some integer Q. By making Q sufficiently large we can make
i’s payoff in his minmax phase close to his minmax payoff, whenever all other players pass
their statistical tests. Second, the statistical test that is performed at the end of the minmax
phase of any player i has to be modified so that it only compares the behavior of all players
other than i at histories at which they were not required to take actions to prevent the
signalling sequence of i occurring.
Modifying the signalling phase and the minmax phases as proposed in the previous para-
graph, however, in turn raises a fourth difficulty. In our pure bounded memory FT, each
player was deterred from deviation from the signalling phase of his punishment path by the
threat of increasing the length of the minmax phase following the signalling phase by T pe-
riods for every deviation. This approach however does not work given the modifications we
have proposed above. To see this, suppose that we fix Q and modify the strategy as proposed
in the previous two paragraphs but still assume that each player is deterred from deviation
from the signalling phase of his punishment path by the threat of increasing the length of
the minmax phase as in the pure strategy case. Next, consider a player i ∈ N and a history
such that the play is in the last stage of the signalling sequence of i’s punishment path and
he has deviated θ−1 times from his signalling phase for some θ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , Q+ i+4}. Then
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the continuation strategy specifies a minmax phase of length θT followed by a reward path.
A one-period deviation at this history induces a minmax phase of length (θ + 1)T followed
by the reward path. For any θ′, let v˜i(θ′, Q) refer to the average (across periods) expected
payoff from the minmax phase with length θ′T . Then, denoting the one-period gain from
deviation by gi and the average expected payoff from the reward phases for player i by ui,
to deter deviation the following must hold:
(1− δθT+1)v˜i(θ,Q) + δθT+1ui − (1− δ(θ+1)T+1)v˜i(θ + 1, Q)− δ(θ+1)T+1ui ≥ (1− δ)gi.
Since the limit of the RHS of the last expression as δ tends to 1 is zero, to ensure that the
incentive to playing according to the signalling phase holds for large δ, we need the limit of
the LHS to be positive:
(1− δθT+1)(v˜i(θ,Q)− v˜i(θ + 1, Q)) + δθT+1(1− δT )(ui − v˜i(θ + 1, Q)) > 0.
While the difference v˜i(θ,Q)− v˜i(θ+1, Q) can be made arbitrarily small by making T and Q
large, the last inequality may not hold because the difference v˜i(θ,Q)− v˜i(θ+ 1, Q) may not
be zero and because θ can be chosen to be as large as Q+ i+3, and hence, δθT+1 can become
arbitrarily small for large values of Q (recall that limδ→1 δT = c < 1 and limδ→1 δθT+1 = cθ
where θ can be chosen to be as large as Q+ i+ 3).
We solve the above difficulty by changing the punishment path for deviating from one’s
own signalling phase as follows. Since the interior of U is non-empty, there exists an action
profile a¯(i) ∈ A such that ui(mi) < maxai∈Ai ui(ai, a¯(i)−i) = ui(a¯(i)).41 The change involves
keeping the length of the minmax phase constant at T independently of the number of
deviations, and then introducing a deterrence phase of length (γ + 1)(Q + i + 4), for some
γ, after the signalling phase and before the start of the minmax phase. The deterrence phase
consists of Q + i + 4 (the length of the signalling phase) consecutive parts with each part
consisting of γ+ 1 consecutive periods. In the first γ periods of any part τ = 1, . . . , Q+ i+ 4
of the deterrence phase the action profile a¯(i) is played if player i has not deviated in the τ -th
41If we assume that there exists an action profile a¯(i) ∈ A such that ui(mi) < maxai∈Ai ui(ai, a¯(i)−i) =
ui(a¯
(i)), then, as mentioned in footnote 36, in Theorem 2 we could weaken the assumption that the interior
of U in Rn is non-empty to the interior of U˜ in Rn being non-empty.
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period of his signalling phase and mi is played if player i has deviated in the τ -th period of
his signalling phase. To avoid a signalling phase to occur, γ is chosen to be less than Q and,
after such γ actions in the (τ + 1)-th period of the part, each player j 6= i is required to play
s′j whereas player i plays a static best-reply to s
′
−i. Since ui(m
i) < ui(a¯
(i)), by choosing γ
sufficiently large, we ensure that player i does not have any incentive to deviate during his
own signalling phase.42
5.1 Difficulties in extending Theorem 2 to n = 2
The proof of the Folk Theorem in Theorem 2 does not apply to the case with two players
because s and s′ need to be different from each other in at least 3 components; otherwise,
confusing instances may arise (the reasoning is the same as that described in Subsection 4.3
for the pure strategy case). More generally, with two players detecting the identity of the
deviator may not be possible. Hence, a common punishment path seems to be needed to
deter deviations. In the pure FT with n = 2, such common punishment consists of playing
the pure mutual minmax profile for a finite number of times. Therefore, one solution would
be to construct a strategy profile similar to that in Theorem 1 with n = 2 except that the
common punishment path involves playing action profiles that are approximately close to
mixed mutually minmax profile for a finite number of periods T (henceforth called mutual
minmax phase), a statistical test at the end of the mutual minmax phase that determines
whether or not each player have played sufficiently close to his part of the mutual minmax
and a continuation strategy that returns to the equilibrium path if both players have passed
the test and restarts the punishment phase otherwise. Thus one applies the method used in
Theorem 2 for n > 2 to the proof of Theorem 1 with n = 2 by having a statistical test as
in Theorem 2 at the end of the mutual minmax phase. Such test, however, seems to require
players to identify the beginning of the mutual minmax phase. As in the proof of Theorem
2, we could deal with this issue by having a signalling phase/sequence at the beginning of
the punishment path before the (common) mutual minmax phase, say ((s′; 2), (s; `), s′) for
42This procedure may also be used in the proof of Theorem 1 with n > 2 to replace the feature adopted
in the proof of increasing the length of the minmax phase in response to deviation made by player in the
signaling phase of his own punishment path with this procedure.
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some `.43 But the introduction of such signalling sequences introduces additional issues in
addition to those in the proof of Theorem 2.
First, we must ensure that no signalling phase occurs during the mutual minmax phase.
As mentioned in the previous subsection, to avoid a similar difficulty in the proof of Theorem
2 with n > 2 the equilibrium strategy profile is chosen such that whenever the sequence
of actions played during i’s minmax phase is such that a signalling sequence is “close”
to happen, then all players other than i take actions to prevent such signalling sequence
to occur. Specifically, in Theorem 2 the signalling phase chosen for i’s minmax phase is
(s′, s′, (s;Q + i + 1), s′) and if the last Q + i + 2 action profiles are (s′, s′, (s;Q + i)), then
players other than the i take action profile s′−i to prevent such signalling sequence to occur
and i does a best response to s′−i. With two players, such an approach requires the actions
taken by the players to prevent the occurrence of the signalling sequence during the minmax
phase to be best responses to each other. This is not an issue if the one shot game G
has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies because s′ could be set to be equal to the Nash
equilibrium and then one could appeal to the method used in the proof of Theorem 2 to
ensure that the signalling phase do not occur during the mutual minmax phase. If the
one shot game, however, does not have a pure Nash equilibrium then the method used in
Theorem 2 need to be modified in order to ensure that signalling phases do not happen
during the mutual minmax phase.
Second, with a signalling phase before the mixed mutual minmax phase, we need to
ensure that the players do not have an incentive to deviate during the signalling phase.
In the proof of the FT with n > 2 in Theorem 2, we dealt with this problem by doing
the following after any single player deviation by player i from the signalling phase of the
punishment path of i: (i) continue with the signalling phase and consider any single player
deviation by i from the signalling phase as being part of the generalised signalling phase,
and (ii) punish the deviations after the signalling phase and before the start of the minmax
43Such a signalling sequence for the mutual minmax phase would be different from the proof of our pure
FT with n = 2 which requires players to play the pure mutual minmax profile by default (specifically, the
players only play an action profile different from the pure mutual minmax profile if some specific histories
have occurred).
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phase by introducing a deterrence phase consisting of Q+ i+ 4 (the length of the signalling
phase) parts of length (γ + 1) for some γ. The deterrence phase in (ii) however also needs
to be such that the signalling phase do not occur during the deterrence phase. To ensure
this in the proof of Theorem 2 we assume that the last period of each part of the deterrence
phase is such that all players other than i play s′−i and player i plays a static best-reply to
s′−i. With n = 2, we face the same issue as that described in the previous paragraph.
With n = 2, a consequence of (i) is that if (a¯1, . . . , a¯`+3) is a signalling phase then any
sequence (a1, . . . , a`+3) ∈ A`+3 such that for each 1 ≤ t ≤ ` + 3, there exists i ∈ {1, 2} such
that ati = a¯
t
i is a generalised signalling phase. This implies that at any history each player
can always induce the signalling phase of the mutual minmax phase singly on his own. But
then the strategy profile must be such that for each player the continuation payoff after any
history is no less than what he can obtain starting from the signalling phase of the common
mutual minmax. While this is not an issue at any history on the equilibrium path, ensuring
that such a property holds at histories during the minmax phase is not easy to establish. For
instance, if failure of passing the test results in restarting the punishment phase, then when
during a mutual minmax phase a player is certain that the statistical test will fail before the
end of the phase, it may be in the player’s interest to deviate and restart the punishment
phase sooner by playing the signalling phase rather than wait for the minmax phase to end.
If the length of the mutual minmax phase T is sufficiently long, deviations of this kind
towards the end of the mutual minmax phase can be deterred provided we modify the strategy
profile such that if the test passes then the continuation payoff is u and if the test fails then
the continuation payoff is some u′ ∈ U˜0 such that u′ < u. This is because with large T
then the players would not want to deviate towards the end of the mutual minmax phase
even when he is almost certain that the statistical test will fail by restarting the signalling
sequence as no deviation guarantees at least u′ whereas deviation results in the minmax
phase of T periods before obtaining at least u′. However, such a modification of the strategy
profile clearly may not be enough to deter deviations early in the mutual minmax phase.
Another approach to detering deviations during the minmax phase that involves restarts
the signalling phase is to modify the construction of the play during the minmax phase.
In paricular, the play in the minmax phase in Theorem 2 is based on following Gossner’s
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approach of constructing a T -period horizon game, fixing any equilibrium of this finite game
and playing the equilibrium in the minmax phase. By modifying the T -period game so
that each player has an additional option of ending the T -period game early by starting the
signalling phase, it may be possible to construct an equilibrium of the game such that no
player would want to exercise the option of starting the signalling phase.
Third, in Theorem 2 with n > 2, an essential part of why during the minmax phase of
any player i it is in the interest of every other player to approximately minmax player i is
the following: in the T -period horizon game used in the construction of the play during the
minmax phase of i, each player other than i can pass the test with a high probability by
(mixed) minmaxing i irrespective of what others do; hence this must also be true in every
equilibrium of the finite game and thus for the minmax phase of each player i. With n = 2
and a common punishment, each player can only pass the test and be rewarded with a high
continuation payoff when both players pass the test. But then a player cannot guarantee
that he can pass the test with a high probability. Indeed, if one player plays in the mutual
minmax phase in such a way that he will fail the test with probability one, then the other
player has an incentive to play static best-replies in each period and, thus, in general will
not pass the test as well.
There may be several ways of dealing with this problem. One possible route may be
to show that the T -period horizon game has an equilibrium in which both players pass the
test with a high probability. We conjecture that this may be true because in such a game
it seems that if one player is passing the test with sufficiently high probability then it is
a best response for the other player to choose a strategy that passes the test with a high
probability. Another route is to have different continuation payoffs depending on who has
passed the test. For example, the continuation payoff would be (approximately) u if both
pass the test, and ui ∈ U˜0 if i passes the test and j 6= i fails and u′ ∈ U˜0 if no player passes
the test with ui ≥ uii > uji ≥ u′i.44
44If such an approach works it may also help to solve some of the other difficulties mentioned above.
For example, in Theorem 2, the deterrence phase after the signalling sequence is assumed in order to deter
deviations during the signalling phase. Such a deterrence phase may not be needed if the continuation payoffs
after the minmax phase could be made to depend on the number of deviations during the signalling phase
(in addition to being dependent on the outcome of the tests).
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Given the current length of this paper and given the above issues we have not generalized
Theorem 2 to the case of two players. We conjecture that such a generalisation is feasible,
however, at this stage such an extension remains an open question.
A Proof of Theorem 1 (pure Folk Theorem)
For all x ∈ Rn, let ||x|| = maxi=1,...,n |xi|. Since U is compact, it suffices to show that for all
ε > 0 and all u ∈ U , there exist M ∈ N and δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all δ ≥ δ∗, there exists
a M -memory SPE f ∈ F p of G∞(δ) with ‖U(f, δ) − u‖ < ε. Furthermore, since U equals
the closure of U0, we only need to show that the above holds for any u ∈ U0. Therefore, in
the rest of this appendix, we show that for all ε > 0 and u ∈ U0, there exist M ∈ N and
δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all δ ≥ δ∗, there exists a M -memory SPE f ∈ F p of G∞(δ) with
‖U(f, δ)− u‖ < ε.
A.1 2-player case
In this subsection, for convenience, we normalize payoffs so that ui(m¯) = 0 for both i = 1, 2.
Fix any ε > 0 and u ∈ U0. Let 0 < η < mini=1,2(ui − vi), 0 < γ < min{η/3, ε/2} and
0 < ξ < 1 be such that 2ξ < η − 2γ.
Order A = {a1, . . . , a|A|} so that a1i 6= m¯i for all i, and a2 = m¯. Also, for any k ∈ N, let
Uk =
{
w ∈ RN : w =
∑
a∈A
pau(a)
k
for some (pa)a∈A such that
pa ∈ N for all a, p1 ≥ 2, p2 ≥ 1 and
∑
a∈A
pa = k
}
.
Using an analogous argument to Sorin (1992, Proposition 1.3), it follows that Uk converges
to co(u(A)) in the Hausdorff distance. Therefore, there must exist K ∈ N such that
co(u(A)) ⊆ ∪x∈UKBγ(x), (5)
where Bγ(x) denotes the open ball of radius γ around x. Let p
1, . . . , p|A| be such that pk ≥ 0
for all 1 ≤ k ≤ r , p1 ≥ 2, p2 ≥ 1, ∑|A|k=1 pk = K and∥∥∥∥∥∥
|A|∑
k=1
pku(ak)
K
− u
∥∥∥∥∥∥ < γ. (6)
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Note that (5) implies that such a sequence p1, . . . , p|A| exists. Let u′ =
∑|A|
k=1 p
ku(ak)/K and
pi consist of repetitions of the cycle ((a1; p1), . . . , (a|A|; p|A|)).
Let T ∈ N and M ∈ N be such that
T > K
(
B
ξ
+ 1
)
, and (7)
M ≥ 2T +K. (8)
Also, let δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) be such that for all δ ∈ [δ∗, 1)
min
{
ξ
δK − δT
1− δK , ξδ
T 1− δT+1
1− δ , δ
M(B + ξ)
}
> B, (9)
sup
(x1,...,xK)∈[−B,B]K
∣∣∣∣∣ 1− δ1− δK
K∑
k=1
δk−1xk − 1
K
K∑
k=1
xk
∣∣∣∣∣ < γ. (10)
Note that such δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) exists because the limit of the left hand side (9) and (10) as δ → 1
are, respectively, min{ξ(T − K)/K, ξ(T + 1), B + ξ} and 0, and because, due to (7) and
0 < ξ < 1, min{ξ(T −K)/K, ξ(T + 1), B + ξ} > B.
Fix any δ ≥ δ∗. We will prove that there is a M -memory SPE f with ||U(f, δ)− u|| < ε.
Note that
||V (pi, δ)− u|| ≤ ||V (pi, δ)− u′||+ ||u′ − u|| < 2γ < ε, (11)
where the second inequality follows from (10) and (6) and the third from the assumption
that γ < ε/2. So it suffices to show that there is a (pure) M -memory SPE f ∈ F p with
pi(f) = pi.
Before defining the strategy profile f , note the following properties of u′ and V t(pi, δ).
First, for all i = 1, 2,
u′i > ui − γ > vi + η − γ > vi + 2ξ, and (12)
V ti (pi, δ) > u
′
i − γ > ui − 2γ > vi + η − 2γ > vi + 2ξ for all t ∈ N. (13)
(The first inequality in (13) follows from (10), the first in (12) and the second in (13) from
(6), the second in (12) and the third in (13) since η < ui− vi and the last inequality in both
(12) and (13) because 2ξ < η − 2γ).
Second, the following claim must hold.
Claim 1 For all i = 1, 2, t ∈ N and δ ≥ δ∗, V ti (pi, δ) ≥ δTVi(pi, δ).
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Proof. Fix any i = 1, 2, t ∈ N and δ ≥ δ∗. Then, V ti (pi) = (1 − δ)
∑K
l=k δ
l−kui(pil) +
δK−k+1Vi(pi) ≥ −B(1− δK−k+1) + δK−k+1Vi(pi) for some 1 ≤ k ≤ K. Hence, since k ≥ 1, it
follows that V ti (pi) ≥ −B(1− δK) + δKVi(pi).
Therefore, it suffices to show that (δK − δT )Vi(pi) ≥ B(1 − δK). This inequality holds
since (13) and (9) imply that (δK − δT )Vi(pi) > (δK − δT )ξ > B(1− δK).
A.1.1 The strategy profile
We define the desired strategy profile f ∈ F p as follows. For any k ∈ N, 0 ≤ k ≤M , let
Hk1 = {h ∈ H : T k(h) = (pi1, . . . , pik)}, (14)
Hk2 = {(pi1, . . . , pik)} if k > 0 and Hk2 = {H0} if k = 0, and (15)
Hk3 = {h ∈ H : TM(h) = ((m¯;M − k), pi1, . . . , pik)}. (16)
We additionally define
Hk =
 Hk1 if k ≥ p1Hk2 ∪Hk3 if k < p1, (17)
HE = ∪Mk=0Hk and HP = H \HE. Then f is defined by
f(h) =
 pik+1 if h ∈ Hk for some 0 ≤ k ≤M,m¯ otherwise. (18)
Claim 2 The strategy profile f ∈ F p is a well defined M-memory strategy.
Proof. By the definition of Hki , i = 1, 2, 3, the following must hold: (i) If h ∈ Hk1 ∩ Hk′1
for some k > k′ ≥ p1, then it must be that k = k′ + αK for some α ∈ N, implying that
pik+1 = pik
′+1. (ii) For any k ≥ p1 and k′ < p1, Hk1 ∩Hk′2 = ∅ and Hk1 ∩Hk′3 = ∅ (if the latter
were not to hold, we would have pi1 = m¯, a contradiction). (iii) For any k, k′ < p1, k 6= k′,
Hki ∩Hk′j = ∅ for any i, j ∈ {2, 3}. It then follows from (i)–(iii) that f is well-defined.
Finally, note that f is a M -memory strategy because its definition is such that f(h)
depends only on TM(h) for all h ∈ H.
A.1.2 Outcome paths induced by f and by one-shot deviations from f
The next two claims establish the continuation paths f induces after any history.
Claim 3 If h ∈ Hk for some 0 ≤ k ≤M , then pi(f |h) = (pik+1, pik+2, . . .).
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Proof. We prove this in several steps.
Step 1: If h ∈ Hk1 and p1 ≤ k ≤ M , then h · f(h) ∈ Hk
′+1
1 for some k
′ such that
p1 ≤ k′ ≤M and k = αK+k′ for some α ∈ N. Suppose that p1 ≤ k ≤M and h ∈ Hk1 . Then
we must have that T k(h) = (pi1, . . . , pik) and f(h) = pik+1. This implies that T k+1(h ·f(h)) =
(pi1, . . . , pik+1). If k < M , the claim of this step holds because (h · pik+1) ∈ Hk+11 and
p1 ≤ k + 1 ≤ M . If k = M , then M ≥ 2K implies that TM(h · f(h)) = (pi2, . . . , pik+1) =
(pi2, . . . , piK , pi1, . . . pik−K+1) with k−K + 1 = M −K + 1 > p1. Hence, the claim of this step
holds because h · f(h) = h · pik−K+1 ∈ Hk−K+11 and k − (k −K) = K.
Step 2: If h ∈ Hk1 and p1 ≤ k ≤ M , then pi(f |h) = (pik+1, pik+2, . . .). This follows by
induction from Step 1 and by noting that pik
′+1 = pik+1 if k = αK + k′ for some α ∈ N.
Step 3: If h ∈ Hk2 ∪Hk3 and 0 ≤ k < p1, then pi(f |h) = (pik+1, pik+2, . . .). If h ∈ Hk2 ∪Hk3
and 0 ≤ k < p1, then by induction, f induces the outcome (pik+1, . . . , pip1) after h. But since
h · (pik+1, . . . , pip1) ∈ Hp11 , the claim of this step follows from Step 2.
It follows trivially from Claim 3 that pi(f) = (pi1, pi2, . . .). Hence, f implements pi.
Claim 4 If h ∈ HP and k = max{0 ≤ k′ ≤ M : T k′(h) = (m¯; k′)}, then k < M and
pi(f |h) = ((m¯;M − k), pi1, pi2, . . .).
Proof. Fix any h ∈ HP and let k be as defined above.
Step 1: k < M . Otherwise, k = M and TM(h) = (m¯;M) producing a contradiction
because then h ∈ H03 ⊆ H \HP .
Step 2: If h · (m¯; l − 1) ∈ HP for some l ∈ {1, . . . ,M − k − 1}, then h · (m¯; l) ∈ HP .
Suppose not; then h · (m¯; l − 1) ∈ HP and h · (m¯; l) ∈ Hk′ for some 0 ≤ k′ ≤ M . Since
a1 6= m¯ and for any τ ≤ p1 we have that (pi1, . . . , piτ ) = (a1; τ), it follows from h ·(m¯; l) ∈ Hk′
that either h · (m¯; l) ∈ Hk′1 and k′ ≥ p1 or TM(h · (m¯; l)) = (m¯;M). But the latter is not
possible because we have by assumption l < M − k (in fact, if TM(h · (m¯; l)) = (m¯;M),
then TM−l(h) = (m¯;M − l) and so k ≥ M − l); therefore, consider the former case. Then
T k
′−1(h · (m¯; l− 1)) = (pi1, . . . , pik′−1). Since h · (m¯; l− 1) ∈ HP , it must be that k′− 1 < p1.
Hence, k′ = p1, k′ − 1 = p1 − 1 ≥ 1 and m¯ = pik′−1 = a1; but this is a contradiction.
Step 3: h · (m¯; l) ∈ HP for all l = 0, . . . ,M − k − 1. Since h ∈ HP and f(h′) = m¯ for all
h′P , this step follows by induction from the previous step.
43
Step 4: pi(f |h) = ((m¯;M − k), pi1, pi2, . . .). By the previous step, f results in (m¯;M − k)
after h. Since TM(h · (m¯;M − k)) = (m¯;M) ∈ H03 , it then follows from Claim 3 that
pi(f |h) = ((m¯;M − k), pi1, pi2, . . .).
The following three claims characterize the consequences of a single deviation by one
player from f .
Claim 5 If h ∈ HE, ai 6= fi(h) and a−i = f−i(h) for some i ∈ {1, 2}, then h · a ∈ HP .
Proof. Suppose not; then h ∈ HE, ai 6= fi(h), a−i = f−i(h) for some i ∈ {1, 2} and
h · a ∈ Hk for some 0 ≤ k ≤M. There are three different cases to consider.
Case 1: h ·a = (pi1, . . . , pik) ∈ Hk2 for some k < p1. Then we must have a = pik, h ∈ Hk−12
and k − 1 < p1. But then f(h) = pik = a; a contradiction.
Case 2: h · a ∈ Hk1 for some k ≥ p1. Then T k(h · a) = (pi1, . . . , pik), a = pik and
T k−1(h) = (pi1, . . . , pik−1). If k > p1, then h ∈ Hk−11 and f(h) = pik = a; a contradiction.
Thus, k = p1, a = pik = a1 and T p
1−1(h) = (a1; p1 − 1). Also, by construction p1 − 1 ≥ 1.
Therefore, it follows from the construction of pi (a1 is followed by a2 = m¯) and the definition
of f that f(h) = a1 or f(h) = m¯. Thus, either f(h) = a or fj(h) 6= aj for all j = 1, 2. But
both cases contradict our initial supposition that ai 6= fi(h) and a−i = f−i(h).
Case 3: h · a ∈ H3k for some 0 ≤ k < p1. If k = 0, then TM(h · a) = (m¯;M), a = m¯
and TM(h) = (a′, (m¯;M − 1)) for some a′ ∈ A. But, since h ∈ HE, it must also be that
a′ = m¯. Thus, TM(h) = (m¯;M) and f(h) = a1. But this is a contradiction because it
implies that a−i = m¯−i 6= a1−i = f−i(h). Hence, it must be that k > 0. Then a = a1 and
TM(h) = (a′, (m¯;M − k), (a1; k − 1)) for some a′ ∈ A. Since k − 1 < p1, h ∈ HE implies
that a′ = m¯, and thus, TM(h) = ((m¯;M − (k − 1)), (a1; k − 1)). But this is a contradiction
because it implies that f(h) = a1 = a.
Claim 6 If h ∈ HE and ai 6= fi(h) and a−i = f−i(h) for some i ∈ {1, 2}, then
pi(f |h · a) =

((m¯;M), pi1, pi2, . . .) if a 6= m¯,
((m¯;M − 1), pi1, pi2, . . .) if a = m¯ and T 1(h) 6= m¯,
((m¯;M − p2 − 1), pi1, pi2, . . .) if a = T 1(h) = m¯.
(19)
Proof. By Claim 5, h · a ∈ HP . Therefore, it follows from Claim 4 that pi(f |h · a) =
((m¯;M − k), pi1, pi2, . . .), where k = max{0 ≤ k′ ≤ M : T k′(h) = (m¯; k′)}. This means that
pi(f |h · a) = ((m¯;M), pi1, pi2, . . .) if a 6= m¯ and pi(f |h · a) = ((m¯;M − 1), pi1, pi2, . . .) if a = m¯
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and T 1(h) 6= m¯. Finally, consider the case a = T 1(h) = m¯. Since f−i(h) = a−i = m¯−i 6= a1−i,
we have f(h) 6= a1. This rules out the possibility that h ∈ Hk′2 ∪ Hk′3 for some k′ < p1.
Therefore, since h ∈ HE, it must be that T k′(h) = (pi1, . . . , pik′) for some k′ ≥ p1. Also,
pik
′
= T 1(h) = m¯ and pik
′+1 = f(h) 6= a = m¯; therefore, we must have k′ = p1 + p2. But this
implies that k = p2 + 1. Hence, we have pi(f |h · a) = ((m¯;M − p2 − 1), pi1, pi2, . . .).
Claim 7 If h ∈ HP , ai 6= fi(h) and a−i = f−i(h) for some i ∈ {1, 2}, then h · a ∈ HP and
pi(f |h · a) = ((m¯;M), pi1, pi2, . . .).
Proof. It follows from h ∈ HP that f(h) = m¯. Thus, a 6= m¯ and a 6= a1. We will next
prove that h · a ∈ HP by showing that h · a /∈ Hk for any 0 ≤ k ≤ M : First, since pik = a1
for any k < p1, a 6= a1 implies that h · a /∈ Hk2 for any k < p1. Second, h · a /∈ Hk3 for any
0 ≤ k < p1 because otherwise a = m¯ (if k = 0) or a = a1 (if k > 0); a contradiction. And
third, if h · a ∈ Hk1 for some k ≥ p1 then pik = a 6= m¯ and pik = a 6= a1. This implies that
k > p1 + p2. Hence, h ∈ Hk−11 for some k − 1 ≥ p1; but this contradicts h ∈ HP .
It follows from above that h · a ∈ HP . Since a 6= m¯, it follows from Claim 4 that
pi(f |h · a) = ((m¯;M), pi1, pi2, . . .).
A.1.3 Incentive conditions
Claim 8 The strategy profile f ∈ F p is SPE.
Proof. We demonstrate this result by showing that one-shot deviations are not profitable
at any history.
Fix any player i, any h ∈ H and any strategy gi ∈ Fi that only differs from fi at
h; thus, gi(h) 6= fi(h) and gi(h′) = fi(h′) for all h′ ∈ H \ {h}. We need to show that
Ui(f |h) ≥ Ui(gi, f−i|h). To show this consider the two possible cases.
Case 1: h ∈ Hk for some 0 ≤ k ≤M . In this case, by Claim 3 and Claim 6 respectively,
pi(f |h) = (pik+1, pik+2, . . .) and pi(gi, f−i|h) = ((ai, pik+1−i ), (m¯; t), pi1, pi2, . . .) for some ai ∈ Ai
and t ≥M − (p2 + 1). Then we have
Ui(f |h)− Ui(gi, f−i|h) = V k+1i (pi)− [(1− δ)ui(ai, pik+1−i ) + δVi((m¯; t) · pi)] ≥
V k+1i (pi)− [(1− δ)B + δ2T+1Vi(pi)] ≥ δT (1− δT+1)Vi(pi)− (1− δ)B
(20)
where the three inequalities in the above follow, respectively, from ui(ai, pi
k+1
−i ) ≤ B, ui(m¯) =
0, t ≥ M − (p2 + 1) ≥ M −K ≥ 2T (the inequality M −K ≥ 2T following from (8)) and
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Claim 1. By (13), we have Vi(pi) > vi + ξ ≥ ξ. By (9), we have δT (1 − δT+1)ξ > (1 − δ)B.
Therefore, it follows from (20) that Ui(f |h)− Ui(gi, f−i|h) > 0.
Case 2: h ∈ HP . In this case, by Claim 4 and Claim 7 respectively, pi(f |h) = ((m¯;M −
t), pi1, pi2, . . .) for some 0 ≤ t < M and pi(gi, f−i|h) = ((ai, m¯−i), (m¯;M), pi1, pi2, . . .) for some
ai ∈ Ai. Since ui(m¯) = 0 and ui(ai, m¯−i) ≤ maxa′i∈Ai ui(a′i, m¯−i) = vi, we must then have
Ui(f |h)− Ui(gi, f−i|h) ≥ δM−tVi(pi)− [(1− δ)vi + δM+1Vi(pi)] ≥
δMVi(pi)− [(1− δ)vi + δM+1Vi(pi)] ≥ (1− δ)(δMVi(pi)− vi).
(21)
By (13), we have that Vi(pi) > vi + 2ξ . By (9), we have δ
M > B
B+ξ
≥ vi
vi+ξ
. Therefore,
δMVi(pi)− vi > 0. But then, by (21), we have Ui(f |h)− Ui(gi, f−i|h) > 0.
A.2 More than 2-player case
In this subsection, for convenience, we normalize payoffs so that vi = 0 for all i ∈ N .
Fix any ε > 0 and any u ∈ U0. Then, by Theorem 1 (Step 1) in Abreu, Dutta, and
Smith (1994), for all i ∈ N there exists yi ∈ U0 satisfying the following property: for some
0 < ζ ′ < mini yii, y
i
i + ζ
′ < ui and yii + ζ
′ < yji for all j ∈ N with j 6= i. Define ξ > 0 to be
such that 2ξ < ε and 4ξ < ζ ′ and ζ = ζ ′ − 4ξ.
Fix any s and s′, both in A, such that si 6= s′i for all i ∈ N . For all k ∈ N, let Vk be
the set of u′ ∈ co(u(A)) such that u′ = ∑a∈A pau(a)/k for some {pa}a∈A satisfying pa ∈ N
and pa ≥ 2n + 2 for all a ∈ A \ {s′, s}, ps′ ≥ 3, ps ≥ 4n + 4 and ∑a∈A pa = k. Using
an analogous argument to Sorin (1992, Proposition 1.3), it follows that Vk converges to
co(u(A)). Therefore, there must exist K ∈ N such that
co(u(A)) ⊆ ∪x∈VKBξ(x). (22)
For all aˆ ∈ A and j ∈ N , letDj(aˆ) = {a ∈ A : a−j = aˆ−j} and D¯j(aˆ) = Dj(aˆ)\{aˆ}. Define
D(aˆ) = ∪j∈NDj(aˆ) and D¯(aˆ) = ∪j∈ND¯j(aˆ). Order all the actions in A = {a1, . . . , a|A|} as
follows: a1 = s, a2, . . . , a|D¯(s)|+1 are the different elements D¯(s), in any order, a|D¯(s)|+2 = s′,
a|D¯(s)|+3, . . . , a|D¯(s)|+|D¯(s
′)|+2 are the different elements of D¯(s′), in any order, and all the
remaining actions are then ordered arbitrarily.
To simplify notation, we also denote y0 = u. For all i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, let xi ∈ VK be such
that ||xi − yi|| < ξ and {pia}a∈A be such that 1K
∑K
a∈A p
i
auj(a) = x
i
j, for all j ∈ N . For all
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i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, define pˆi(i) as the repetition of the cycle(
(s′; 2), (s;n+ i+ 2), s′, (a1; p(i),1), . . . , (a|A|; p(i),|A|)
)
,
where p(i),j = piaj − 3 if aj = s′, p(i),j = piaj − (n+ i+ 2) if aj = s and p(i),j = piaj otherwise.
Note that the length of the cycle is K, i.e.,
∑r
j=1 p
(i),j + n+ 5 + i = K for all i ∈ {0, . . . , n}.
In the construction below, pˆi(i) will be the equilibrium path when i = 0 (also sometimes
denoted by pi(0)) and the reward path of player i when i > 0.
Let T ∈ N be such that
T > 2 max
{
(K + n+ 6)
B
ζ
,K
}
. (23)
Also let pi(i) =
(
(s′; 2), (s; i+ 1), s′, (mi;T ), pˆi(i)
)
and
pi(i)(θ, t) =

(
pi(i),t, . . . , pi(i),i+4, (mi; (θ + 1)T ), pˆi(i)
)
if t ≤ i+ 4 and(
(mi; (θ + 1)T ), pˆi(i)
)
if t = i+ 5,
for any i ∈ N , θ ∈ N0 and t ∈ {1, . . . , i+ 5}. Define the size of the memory M ∈ N be such
that
M ≥ T (n+ 5) + (n+ 4) + (2n+ 5) + (n+ 4) = 4n+ 13 + T (n+ 5).
Also, let δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) be such that δ ≥ δ∗ implies
min
{
δK − δn+6+T
2− δK − δn+6 ,
δn+5+(n+4)T (1− δT )
2(1− δn+5) ,
δ(n+5)(T+1)
2− 2δ(n+5)(T+1) − δn+6(1− δT )
}
>
B
ζ
(24)
sup
x∈[−B,B]K
∣∣∣∣∣ 1− δ1− δK
K∑
k=1
δk−1xk − 1
K
K∑
k=1
xk
∣∣∣∣∣ < ξ. (25)
Note that such δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) exists because the limit of the left hand side of (24) and (25) as
δ → 1 are, respectively, min{(T +n+ 6−K)/(K+n+ 6), T/2(n+ 5)} and 0, and the former
limit exceeds B/ζ by (23).
Fix any δ ≥ δ∗. We will now demonstrate the result by constructing a (pure) M -memory
SPE strategy profile f ∈ F p with ||U(f)− u|| < ε.
Note that
||V (pˆi(0), δ)− u|| ≤ ||V (pˆi(0), δ)− x0||+ ||x0 − u|| < 2ξ < ε,
where the second inequality follows from (25) and the definition of x0 and the third from
ξ < ε/2. So it suffices to show that there is a (pure)M -memory SPE f ∈ F p with pi(f) = pˆi(0).
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A.2.1 The strategy profile
For all τ ∈ N and d ∈ N , define
Σd,τ =
{
h ∈ H : h = (at)τt=1 such that at ∈ Dd(s) if t = 3, . . . , d+ 3
and at ∈ Dd(s′) if t = 1, 2, d+ 4
}
and Σd,0 = {H0} for all d ∈ N . Also, for all τ ≥ d+ 4 and all h ∈ Σd,τ , let
θ(h) = |{t ∈ {1, 2, d+ 4} : atd 6= s′d}|+ |{t ∈ {3, . . . , d+ 3} : atd 6= sd}|.
For all d ∈ N , define Γd,0 = {H0} and, for all τ ∈ N,
Γd,τ =
{
h ∈ H : h = (at)τt=1 and at ∈ Dd(md) for all 1 ≤ t ≤ τ
}
.
Define for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, d ∈ N , and τ, r ∈ N0 the following sets:45
H
(i),k
1,a =
{
h ∈ H : T k(h) = (pˆi(i),1, . . . , pˆi(i),k)} ,
H
(i),k
1,b =
{
h ∈ H : h = (pˆi(i),1, . . . , pˆi(i),k)} ,
H
(i),k
1 = H
(i),k
1,a ∪H(i),k1,b ,
Hk,d,τ2 =
{
h ∈ H : T k(h) = h¯ · a · h˜ such that for some k′ ≤ k and i ∈ {0, . . . , n}
(1) either h¯ ∈ H(i),k′1,a with k′ ≥ n+ i+ 5 or h¯ ∈ H(i),k
′
1,b with `(h) = k,
k′ < n+ 5 and i = 0, (2) a ∈ D¯d(pˆi(i),k′+1), (3) h˜ ∈ Σd,τ and
(4) if T d+3(h¯ · a) = ((s′; 2), (s; d), a) and a ∈ D¯d(s), then `(h˜) = 0
}
,
Hk,d3 =
{
h ∈ H : T k(h) = h¯ · h˜ such that (1) h¯ ∈ Σd,d+4 and
(2) h˜ ∈ Γd,l for some 0 ≤ l < (θ(h¯) + 1)T
}
,
Hk,d,r4 =
{
h ∈ H : T k(h) = h¯ · hˆ · h˜ such that (1) h¯ ∈ Σd,d+4,
(2) hˆ ∈ Γd,l with l = (θ(h¯) + 1)T and (3) h˜ ∈ H(d),r1,b
}
,
Hk,d,τ5 =
{
h ∈ H : T k(h) = h¯ · a · h˜ such that for some k′ ≤ k and i ∈ N
(1) either h¯ ∈ Hk′,i3 , a ∈ D¯d(mi) and d 6= i
or h¯ ∈ Hk′,i,r4 and a ∈ D¯d(pˆi(i),r+1) for some r < n+ i+ 5, (2) h˜ ∈ Σd,τ and
(3) if T d+3(h¯ · a) = ((s′; 2), (s; d), a) and a ∈ D¯d(s), then `(h˜) = 0
}
.
45Note that, for some of these parameters, the sets below may be empty in some cases.
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We next define H1,a = ∪ni=0
(
∪Mk=n+i+5H(i),k1,a
)
, H
(0),0
1,b = {H0}, H1,b = ∪n+4k=0H(0),k1,b , H1 =
H1,a ∪H1,b, H2 = ∪Mk=1
(
∪d∈N
(
∪d+3τ=0Hk,d,τ2
))
, H3 = ∪Mk=1
(
∪d∈NHk,d3
)
,
H4 = ∪Mk=1
(
∪d∈N
(
∪n+d+4r=0 Hk,d,r4
))
, and H5 = ∪Mk=1
(
∪d∈N
(
∪d+3τ=0Hk,d,τ5
))
.
Let Σ˜d,τ = {h ∈ H : T τ+1(h) = a · h˜, h˜ ∈ Σd,τ and a ∈ D¯d(s) ∪ D¯d(s′)} for all d ∈ N and
τ ∈ N0. Define, for all d ∈ N and τ ∈ {0, . . . , d+ 3},
Hd,τ6 =
(
H \ ∪5l=1Hl
) ∩ Σ˜d,τ . (26)
Let H6 = ∪d∈N
(
∪d+3τ=0Hd,τ6
)
. Also, for all t ∈ {0, . . . , n+ 4}, define
H t7 = {h ∈ H \ ∪6l=1Hl : T t(h) ∈ H(0),t1,b }. (27)
The strategy f ∈ F p is now defined as follows: For any h ∈ H,
f(h) =

pˆi(0),k+1 if h ∈ H(0),k1,b for some k ∈ {0, . . . , n+ 4},
pˆi(i),k+1 if h ∈ H(i),k1,a for some i ∈ {0, . . . , n} and k ∈ {n+ i+ 5, . . . ,M},
s if h ∈
(
∪Mk=1 ∪d∈N ∪d+2τ=2(Hk,d,τ2 ∪Hk,d,τ5 ∪Hd,τ6 )
)
∪ (∪n+3t=2 H t7) ,
md if h ∈ ∪Mk=1Hk,d3 for some d ∈ N,
pˆi(d),r+1 if h ∈ ∪Mk=1Hk,d,r4 for some d ∈ N and r ∈ {0, . . . , n+ d+ 4},
s′ otherwise.
(28)
Clearly, f is M -memory. In the supplementary materials, we show that f is well-defined.
To enable us to show that f is a SPE and pi(f) = pˆi(0), we first need to describe the
outcome paths induced by strategy profile f and those obtained by one-shot deviations
from f . Claims 9-19 describe these outcome paths while their proofs are presented in the
supplementary materials, Section A.3.
Claim 9 If h ∈ H(i),k1,a for some i ∈ {0, . . . , n} and k ∈ {n + i + 5, . . . ,M}, then pi(f |h) =
(pˆi(i),k+1, pˆi(i),k+2, . . .).
Claim 10 If h ∈ H(0),k1,b for some k ∈ {0, . . . , n+ 4}, then pi(f |h) = (pi(0),k+1, pi(0),k+2, . . .).
Claim 11 If h ∈ Hk,d,r4 for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, d ∈ N and r ∈ {0, . . . , n + d + 4}, then
pi(f |h) = (pˆi(d),r+1, pˆi(d),r+2, . . .).
Claim 12 If h ∈ Hk,d3 for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and d ∈ N , then pi(f |h) = ((md; (θ+ 1)T −
k + d+ 4), pˆi(d),1, pˆi(d),2, . . .) where θ = θ(T k(h)).
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Claim 13 Let h ∈ Hk,d,τ2 ∪Hk,d,τ5 ∪Hd,τ6 for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, d ∈ N and τ ∈ {0, . . . , d+
3}, and a¯ ∈ Dd(f(h)). Then there exists θ¯(a¯) ∈ {0, . . . , d+ 4} and t(a¯) ∈ {1, . . . , d+ 5} such
that pi(f |h · a¯) = pi(d)(θ¯(a¯), t(a¯)) and θ¯(f(h)) < θ¯(a¯) for any a¯ ∈ D¯d(f(h)).
Claim 14 Let h ∈ Hk7 for some k ∈ {0, . . . , n + 4}. If h 6∈ ∪n+3k=2Hk7 and T d+3(h) ∈ Σd,d+3
for some d ∈ N , then pi(f |h) = (s′, (md; (θ + 1)T ), pˆi(d),1, . . .) where θ = θ(T d+3(h) · s′).
Otherwise, pi(f |h) = (pˆi(i),k′+1, pˆi(i),k′+2, . . .) for some i ∈ {0, . . . , n} and k′ ∈ {0, . . . , n+i+4}.
Claim 15 Let h ∈ H1 and a¯ ∈ D¯d(f(h)) for some d ∈ N . Then pi(f |h · a¯) = f(h · a¯) ·pid(θ, t)
for some θ ∈ {0, . . . , d+ 4} and t ∈ {1, . . . , d+ 5}.
Claim 16 Let h ∈ Hk,d′,τ ′2 ∪ Hk,d
′,τ ′
5 ∪ Hd
′,τ ′
6 for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, d′ ∈ N and τ ′ ∈
{0, . . . , d′ + 3}. Let d 6= d′ and a¯ ∈ D¯d(f(h)). Then, for some θ ∈ {0, . . . , d + 4} and
t ∈ {1, . . . , d+ 5}, either pi(f |h · a¯) = pi(d)(θ, d+ 5) or pi(f |h · a¯) = f(h · a¯) · pi(d)(θ, t).
Claim 17 Let h ∈ Hk,d′3 for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and d′ ∈ N and let a¯ ∈ D¯d(f(h)) for
some d ∈ N . If d = d′, then pi(f |h · a¯) = ((md; (θ + 1)T − [k + 1− (d+ 4)]), pˆi(d),1, . . .) where
θ = θ(T k(h)). If d 6= d′, then pi(f |h · a¯) = f(h · a¯) · pi(d)(θ, t) for some θ ∈ {0, . . . , d+ 4} and
t ∈ {1, . . . , d+ 5}.
Claim 18 Let h ∈ Hk,d′,r4 for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, d′ ∈ N and r ∈ {0, . . . , n + d′ + 4},
and let a¯ ∈ D¯d(f(h)) for some d ∈ N . Then pi(f |h · a¯) = f(h · a¯) · pi(d)(θ, t) for some
θ ∈ {0, . . . , d+ 4} and t ∈ {1, . . . , d+ 5}.
Claim 19 Let h ∈ Hk7 for some k ∈ {0, . . . , n + 4}, and a¯ ∈ D¯d(f(h)) for some d ∈ N .
If h 6∈ ∪n+3k=2Hk7 and T d+3(h) ∈ Σd,d+3, then pi(f |h · a¯) =
(
(md; (θ + 1)T ), pˆi(d),1, . . .
)
where
θ = θ(T d+3(h) · s′) + 1. Otherwise, pi(f |h · a¯) = f(h · a¯) ·pi(d)(θ, t) for some θ ∈ {0, . . . , d+ 4}
and t ∈ {1, . . . , d+ 5}.
A.2.2 f is subgame perfect and pi(f) = pˆi(0)
Claims 9 and 10 establish that the strategy profile f ∈ F p induces pˆi(0), hence, pi(f) = pˆi(0).
Before showing f is subgame perfect, it needs to be pointed out that in Claim A.1 in the
supplementary material we show that the payoffs of different paths (pˆi(0), . . . , pˆi(n)) satisfy
the following inequalities: for all i ∈ {0, . . . , n} and d, d′ ∈ N with d 6= d′:
−B(1− δ(n+5)(T+1)) + δ(n+5)(T+1)Vd(pˆi(d′)) > B(1− δn+6) + δn+6+TVd(pˆi(d)), (29)
−B(1− δK) + δKVd(pˆi(i)) > (1− δn+6)B + δn+6+TVd(pˆi(d)), (30)
−(1− δn+5)B + δn+5+(n+4)TVd(pˆi(d)) > (1− δn+5)B + δ(n+5)(T+1)Vd(pˆi(d)). (31)
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To show that f is subgame perfect we need to establish the following for all h ∈ H:
Vd(pi(f |h)) ≥ (1− δ)ud(a¯) + δVd(pi(f |h · a¯)) for all d ∈ N and a¯ ∈ D¯d(f(h)). (32)
Case 1: h ∈ H1 ∪H4. In this case, by Claims 9, 10 and 11, pi(f |h) = (pˆi(i),k, . . .) for some
i ∈ {0, . . . , n} and k ≤ M . Also, by Claims 15 and 18, pi(f |h · a¯) = f(h · a¯) · pi(d)(θ, t) for
some θ ∈ {0, . . . , d + 4} and t ∈ {1, . . . , d + 5}. Therefore, the left-hand side of (32) must
be greater or equal to −B(1 − δK−k+1) + δK−k+1Vd(pˆi(i)) ≥ −B(1 − δK) + δKVd(pˆi(i)) and
the right-hand side of (32) is less than or equal to (1 − δd+7−t)B + δd+7−t+(θ+1)TVd(pˆi(d)) ≤
(1− δd+6)B + δd+6+TVd(pˆi(d)). Thus, by (30), (32) must hold.
Case 2: h ∈ Hk,d′3 for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and d′ ∈ N . Claim 12 implies that pi(f |h) =
((md
′
; (θ+ 1)T − [k− (d′+ 4)], pˆi(d′),1, . . .), where θ = θ(T k(h)). Claim 17 implies that pi(f |h ·
a¯) =
(
(md; (θ + 1)T − [k + 1− (d+ 4)], pˆi(d),1, . . .) if d = d′ and pi(f |h · a¯) = f(h · a¯) ·pi(d)(θ, t)
for some θ ∈ {0, . . . , d + 4} and t ∈ {1, . . . , d + 5} if d 6= d′. Clearly, the deviation is not
profitable if d = d′. When d 6= d′, the left-hand side of (32) must be greater or equal to
(1− δ(θ+1)T−k+d′+4)ud(md′) + δ(θ+1)T−k+d′+4Vd(pˆi(d′)) ≥ −(1− δ(n+5)T )B+ δ(n+5)TVd(pˆi(d′)) and
the right-hand side of (32) is less than or equal to (1 − δd+6)B + δd+6+TVd(pˆi(d)). Thus, by
(29), (32) must hold.
Case 3: h ∈ Hk,d,τ2 ∪Hk,d,τ5 ∪Hd,τ6 for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and τ ∈ {0, . . . , d+3}. Claim
13 implies that pi(f |h) = f(h) ·pi(d)(θ, t) and pi(f |h · a¯) = pi(d)(θ′, t′) for some t, t′ ∈ {1, . . . , d+
5} and θ, θ′ ∈ {0, . . . , d + 4} such that θ < θ′. Therefore, the left-hand side of (32) must be
greater or equal to−(1−δd+6−t)B+δd+6−t+(θ+1)TVd(pˆi(d)) ≥ −(1−δd+5)B+δd+5+(θ+1)TVd(pˆi(d))
and the right-hand side of (32) is less than or equal to (1−δd+6−t′)B+δd+6−t′+(θ′+1)TVd(pˆi(d)) ≤
(1− δd+5)B + δd+5+(θ′+1)TVd(pˆi(d)). Thus, by (31) and θ < θ′, (32) must hold.
Case 4: h ∈ Hk,d′,τ2 ∪ Hk,d
′,τ
5 ∪ Hd
′,τ
6 for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and d′ ∈ N and τ ∈
{0, . . . , d′ + 3} such that d′ 6= d. Claim 13 implies that pi(f |h) = f(h) · pi(d′)(θ′, t′) for
some t′ ∈ {1, . . . , d′ + 5} and θ′ ∈ {0, . . . , d′ + 4}. Also, Claim 16 implies that, for some t ∈
{1, . . . , d+5} and θ ∈ {0, . . . , d+4}, pi(f |h·a¯) = pi(d)(θ, d+5) or pi(f |h·a¯) = f(h·a¯)·pi(d)(θ, t).
Therefore, the left-hand side of (32) must be greater or equal to −(1− δd′+6−t′+(θ′+1)T )B +
δd
′+6−t′+(θ′+1)TVd(pˆi(d
′)) ≥ −(1 − δ(n+5)(T+1))B + δ(n+5)(T+1)Vd(pˆi(d′)). The right-hand side of
(32) is less than or equal to (1 − δ)B + δT+1Vd(pˆi(d)) ≤ (1 − δn+6)B + δn+6+TVd(pˆi(d)) if
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pi(f |h · a¯) = pi(d)(θ, d + 5) and is less than or equal to (1 − δd+6)B + δd+6+(θ+1)TVd(pˆi(d)) ≤
(1− δn+6)B+ δn+6+TVd(pˆi(d)) if pi(f |h · a¯) = f(h · a¯) ·pi(d)(θ, t). Thus, by (29), (32) must hold.
Case 5: h ∈ Hk7 for some k ∈ {0, . . . , n + 4} and h 6∈ ∪n+3k=2Hk7 and T d+3(h) ∈ Σd,d+3.
Claims 14 and 19 imply that we must have pi(f |h) = (s′d; (θ + 1)T ), pˆi(d),1, . . .) and pi(f |h·a¯) =(
(md; (θ + 2)T ), pˆi(d),1, . . .
)
for some θ ∈ {0, . . . , d+ 3}. Therefore, the left-hand side of (32)
must be greater or equal to −(1− δ)B + δ(θ+1)T+1Vd(pˆi(d)) and the right-hand side of (32) is
less than or equal to (1− δ)B + δ(θ+2)T+1Vd(pˆi(d)). Thus, by (31), (32) must hold.
Case 6: h ∈ Hk7 for some k ∈ {0, . . . , n + 4} and h 6∈ ∪n+3k=2Hk7 and T d
′+3(h) ∈ Σd′,d′+3
for some d′ 6= d. Claims 14 and 19 imply that pi(f |h) = (s′d′ ; (θ′ + 1)T ), pˆi(d′),1, . . .) for
some θ′ ∈ {0, . . . , d′ + 4} and pi(f |h · a¯) = f(h · a¯) · pi(d)(θ, t) for some θ ∈ {0, . . . , d + 4}
and t ∈ {1, . . . , d + 5}. Therefore, the left-hand side of (32) must be greater or equal
to −(1 − δ1+(θ′+1)T )B + δ1+(θ′+1)TVd(pˆi(d′)) ≥ −(1 − δ(n+5)(T+1))B + δ(n+5)(T+1)Vd(pˆi(d′)) and
the right-hand side of (32) is less than or equal to (1 − δd+6)B + δd+6+(θ+1)TVd(pˆi(d)) ≤
(1− δn+6)B + δn+6+TVd(pˆi(d)). Thus, by (29), (32) must hold.
Case 7: h ∈ Hk7 and either h ∈ ∪n+3k=2Hk7 or T d
′+3(h) 6∈ Σd′,d′+3 for all d′ ∈ N . Claim 14
implies that pi(f |h) = (pˆi(i),k, . . .) for some i ∈ {0, . . . , n} and k ≤ M . Also, by Claim 19,
pi(f |h · a¯) = f(h · a¯) · pi(d)(θ, t) for some θ ∈ {0, . . . , d+ 4} and t ∈ {1, . . . , d+ 5}. Therefore,
by an identical argument as in Case 1, (32) must hold.
B Proof of Theorem 2 (mixed Folk Theorem)
We normalize payoffs so that the mixed strategy minmax payoff v˜i = 0 for all i ∈ N .
B.1 Some preliminary results
First, we establish two lemmas needed in the construction of our equilibrium strategies.
By the full-dimensionality assumption, for each i ∈ N , there exist action profiles a¯(i) ∈ A
such that ui(m
i) < maxai∈Ai ui(ai, a¯
(i)
−i) = ui(a¯
(i)). As before, B = maxi∈N,a∈A |ui(a)|. Let
γ ∈ R be such that
γ(ui(a¯
(i))− ui(mi)) > 2B for all i ∈ N. (33)
As before, fix any s and s′, both in A, such that si 6= s′i for all i ∈ N . Then for all
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d ∈ N,Q ∈ N, hˆ = (aˆ1, . . . , aˆt) ∈ H, δ ∈ (0, 1), i ∈ N and η > 0 let
Σˆd,τ (Q) =
{
h ∈ H : h = (at)τt=1 such that at ∈ Dd(s) if t = 2, . . . , d+Q+ 1
and at ∈ Dd(s′) if t = 1
}
,
S(hˆ, Q) = {1} ∪
{
k ∈ {Q+ 2, . . . , t} : TQ+1(aˆ1, . . . , aˆk−1) ∈ Σˆl,(Q+1)(Q) for some l ∈ N
}
,
λ(a, hˆ, Q, δ) =
∑
k 6∈S(hˆ,Q)
δk−11a(aˆk),
λi(a−i, hˆ, Q, δ) =
∑
bi∈Ai
λ((bi, a−i), hˆ, Q, δ),
Φdi (hˆ, Q, δ) =
1− δ
1− δt
∑
a∈A
|λ(a, hˆ, Q, δ)− λi(a−i, hˆ, Q, δ)µdi (ai)|,
αdi (hˆ, Q, δ, η) =
 1 if Φdi (hˆ, Q, δ) < η,0 otherwise.
We can then state our first lemma.
Lemma 1 For every ζ > 0 and 0 < ε1 < 1, there exist Q ∈ N with Q > γ and η > 0 such
that for every d ∈ N and δ ∈ (0, 1) and t ∈ N and hˆ = (aˆ1, . . . , aˆt) ∈ Ht such that δt ≥ ζ
and αdi (hˆ, δ, Q, η) = 1 for all i 6= d, we have
1− δ
1− δt
t∑
k=1
δk−1ud(aˆk) < ε1.
The proof of the above lemma has some similarity to that of Lemma 1 in Gossner (1995).
See the supplementary materials for the proof of Lemma 1.
Next fix i, d ∈ N with i 6= d and let µ˜di ∈ Fmi be player i’s strategy consisting of playing
µdi each period independently of the history. Recall that for any strategy f−i ∈ Fm−i for the
remaining players and t ∈ N, P(µ˜di ,f−i),t denotes the probability measure on Ht induced by
(µ˜di , f−i). We next establish our second lemma.
Lemma 2 For all c ∈ (0, 1), Q ∈ N, η > 0 and ε2 > 0, there exists a function t(·) : (0, 1)→
N and δ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that, for all δ ≥ δ¯, |δt(δ) − c| < ε2 and
P(µ˜di ,f−i),t(δ)
(
{hˆ ∈ Ht(δ) : Φdi (hˆ, Q, δ) ≥ η}
)
< ε2
for all i, d ∈ N with i 6= d and for any f−i ∈ Fm−i. Furthermore, we have that limδ→1 δt(δ) = c.
53
Henceforth, we shall omit the dependence of Σˆd(.), S(.), λ(.), λi(.),Φ
d
i (.), α
d
i (.) on hˆ, Q, δ
or η whenever the meaning is clear.
Proof. Let c ∈ (0, 1), Q ∈ N, η > 0 and ε2 > 0 be given. For each δ ∈ (0, 1), let t(δ)
be the highest integer t ∈ N such that δt ≥ c. Then |δt(δ) − c| < (1 − δ)/δ and therefore
limδ→1 δt(δ) = c. Hence, there exists δ1 ∈ (0, 1) such that |δt(δ) − c| < ε2 for all δ ≥ δ1.
For each δ ∈ (0, 1), let
b(δ) =
(1− δ)(1 + δt(δ))
(1 + δ)(1− δt(δ)) .
Also, let κ = η/|A|. Since limδ→1 b(δ) = 0, there exists δ¯ ∈ [δ1, 1) such that e−
2κ2
b(δ) < ε2/|A|
for all δ > δ.
Next, note that for all i, d ∈ N with i 6= d and f−i ∈ Fm−i
P(µ˜di ,f−i),t(δ)
({
hˆ ∈ Ht(δ) :
∑
a∈A
∣∣∣∣ 1− δ1− δt(δ) (λ(a)− λi(a−i)µdi (ai))
∣∣∣∣ ≥ η
})
≤
∑
a
P(µ˜di ,f−i),t(δ)
({
hˆ ∈ Ht(δ) :
∣∣∣∣ 1− δ1− δt(δ) (λ(a)− λi(a−i)µdi (ai))
∣∣∣∣ ≥ κ}) .
Since e−
2κ2
b(δ) < ε2/|A| for all δ ≥ δ¯, to demonstrate the result, it suffices to show that for all
δ ≥ δ¯
P(µ˜di ,f−i),t(δ)
({
hˆ ∈ Ht(δ) :
∣∣∣∣ 1− δ1− δt(δ) (λ(a)− λ(a−i)µdi (ai))
∣∣∣∣ ≥ κ}) ≤ e− 2κ2b(δ) , (34)
for every i, d ∈ N with i 6= d and a ∈ A and f−i ∈ Fm−i. In the rest of the proof we shall fix
i, d ∈ N with i 6= d and a ∈ A and f−i ∈ Fm−i and δ ≥ δ¯, and show that (34) holds.
To simplify the notation, when the meaning is clear, we shall denote t(δ) by t.
For any hˆ = (aˆ1, . . . , aˆt) ∈ Ht and any 1 ≤ k ≤ t, let Xk(hˆ) = 1{aˆki =ai}, Yk(hˆ) = 1{aˆk−i=a−i},
Wk(hˆ) =
 1{TQ+1(aˆ1,...,aˆk−1)/∈∪l∈N Σˆl,Q+1} if k > 1,0 if k = 1,
and Zk(hˆ) = (Xk(hˆ), Yk(hˆ),Wk(hˆ)). Again when the meaning is clear, we shall denote
Xk(hˆ), Yk(hˆ),Wk(hˆ) and Zk(hˆ), by Xk, Yk,Wk and Zk, respectively.
Denote µdi (ai) by p and let
f(Z1, . . . , Zt) =
1− δ
1− δt
t∑
k=1
δk−1 (Xk − p)YkWk.
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Then the RHS of the last equation is equal to
1− δ
1− δt
t∑
k=1
δk−1(1ai(aˆ
k
i )− p)1a−i(aˆk−i)Wk =
1− δ
1− δt
t∑
k=1
δk−1
(
1a(aˆ
k)− 1a−i(aˆk−i)µdi (ai)
)
Wk
=
1− δ
1− δt (λ(a)− λ(a−i)µ
d
i (ai)).
Hence, (34) is equivalent to the following condition
P(µ˜di ,f−i)
(
{hˆ ∈ Ht : |f(Z1, . . . , Zt)| ≥ κ}
)
≤ e− 2κ
2
b(δ) (35)
To show this, assume that (µ˜di , f−i) is chosen and, for any z = (z1, . . . , zt) ∈ {0, 1}3t, k ∈
{1, . . . , t} and z = (x, y, w) ∈ {0, 1}3, let Bk(z) = {Zl = zl for all l = 1, . . . , k − 1} and
gk(z, z) = E(f(Z1, . . . , Zt)|Bk(z), Zk = z)− E(f(Z1, . . . , Zt)|Bk(z)).
Also, let rank(z) = sup{|gk(z, z) − gk(z′, z)| : z, z′ ∈ {0, 1}3}, R2(z) =
∑t
k=1(rank(z))
2 and
rˆ2 = supz∈{0,1}3t R
2(z).
Then, by Theorem 3.7 in McDiarmid (1998),
P(µ˜di ,f−i)
(
{hˆ ∈ Ht : |f(Z1, . . . , Zt)| − E(f(Z1, . . . , Zt)) ≥ κ}
)
≤ e− 2κ
2
rˆ2 . (36)
Therefore, to complete the proof of this lemma we need to show that E(f(Z1, . . . , Zt)) = 0
and rˆ2 = b (δ). We establish these in the next three claims.
Claim 20 E(f(Z1, . . . , Zt)) = 0.
Proof. We have that
E(f(Z1, . . . , Zt)) =
1− δ
1− δt
t∑
k=1
δk−1E ((Xk − p)YkWk)
=
1− δ
1− δt
t∑
k=1
δk−1E (Xk − p)E(YkWk) = 0
where the second equality above follows from Xk and (Yk,Wk) being independent and the
third equality from E(Xk) = p for all 1 ≤ k ≤ t.
Claim 21 For each z = (z1, . . . , zt) ∈ {0, 1}3t and k ∈ {1, . . . , t} and z = (x, y, w) ∈ {0, 1}3,
gk(z, z) =
1− δ
1− δt δ
k−1(x− p)yw.
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Proof. Fix any z = (z1, . . . , zt) ∈ {0, 1}3t and k ∈ {1, . . . , t} and z = (x, y, w) ∈ {0, 1}3,
and denote Bk(z) by Bk for simplicity in the rest of this proof. Note that (i) for each k
′ ≥ k,
Xk′ and (Yk′ ,Wk′) are independent given Bk and E(Xk′ |Bk) = p, and (ii) for each k′ > k,
Xk′ and (Yk′ ,Wk′) are independent given Bk ∩ {Zk = z} and E(Xk′ |Bk, Zk = z) = p. So
E(f(Z1, . . . , Zt)|Bk) = 1− δ
1− δt
(
k−1∑
l=1
δl−1(xl − p)ylwl +
t∑
l=k
δl−1E((Xl − p)YlWl|Bk)
)
=
1− δ
1− δt
k−1∑
l=1
δl−1(xl − p)ylwl
and
E(f(Z1, . . . , Zt)|Bk, Zk = zk) = 1− δ
1− δt
k∑
l=1
δl−1(xl − p)ylwl
+
1− δ
1− δt
t∑
l=k+1
δl−1E((Xl − p)YlWl|Bk, Zk = zk)
=
1− δ
1− δt
k∑
l=1
δl−1(xl − p)ylwl.
Hence, the result follows.
Claim 22 rˆ2 = b(δ).
Proof. We start by establishing that
rank(z) =
1− δ
1− δt δ
k−1
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , t} and z = (z1, . . . , zt ∈ {0, 1}3(t). Indeed, it follows by Claim 21 that for
all z and z′ ∈ {0, 1}3
|gk(z, z)− gk(z′, z)| = 1− δ
1− δt δ
k−1|(x− p)yw − (x′ − p)y′w′|.
Note that (x−p)yw ∈ {−p, 0, 1−p} and similarly for (x′−p)y′w′. Hence, |(x−p)yw− (x′−
p)y′w′| ≤ 1− p− (−p) = 1, thus, ran(z1, . . . , zk−1) = 1−δ1−δt δk−1.
Therefore, for all z = (z1, . . . , zt) ∈ {0, 1}3t,
R2(z) =
(
1− δ
1− δt
)2 t∑
k=1
δ2(k−1),
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hence,
rˆ2 =
(
1− δ
1− δt
)2 t∑
k=1
δ2(k−1) =
(1− δ)2
(1− δt)2
1− δ2t
1− δ2 =
1− δ
1 + δ
1 + δt
1− δt = b(δ).
Claims 20 and 22 complete the proof of the lemma.
B.2 The strategy profile
This section describes the equilibrium strategy profile employed in the proof.
B.2.1 Parametrization
Since U˜ is compact and U˜ equals the closure of U˜0, to establish Theorem 2, it suffices to
show that, for all ε > 0 and u ∈ U˜0, there exists δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that, for all δ ≥ δ∗, there
are M ∈ N and a M -memory SPE f of G∞m (δ) with ‖U(f, δ)− u‖ < ε.
Fix any ε > 0 and any u ∈ U˜0. Since G is full-dimensional, we may assume that
u ∈ int(U˜0). Let u′ ∈ int(U˜0) such that u′ < u, and ρ > 0 be such that (i) u′i + ρ < ui for all
i ∈ N and (ii) ||uˆ− u′|| ≤ ρ implies uˆ ∈ U˜0. Also, fix any
ε1 ∈ (0,min
d∈N
u′d). (37)
Let Q ∈ N and η > 0 be as in Lemma 1, corresponding to ζ = 1/2 and to ε1 defined by (37).
Let ε2 > 0 be such that
ε2 < 1− ζ, and (38)
ε¯ < min
d∈N
u′d, (39)
where ε¯ is defined by
ε¯ = (1− 2ε2)n ε1 + (1− (1− 2ε2)n)B.
Let c ∈ (0, 1) be such that
c > ζ + ε2, (40)
cρε2 > (1− c)2B, and (41)
c(1− 2ε2)ρ > (1− c)(B + ε¯). (42)
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By (38), it is clear that such c exists. Let δ¯ be as in Lemma 2, corresponding to Q, η, ε2 and
c as defined above.
Define ξ > 0 to be such 2ξ < ε and
(1− c)(min
d
u′d − ε¯) > (1 + c)2ξ, (43)
c(ρε2 − 4ξ) > (1− c)2B, (44)
c((1− 2ε2)ρ− 4ξ) > (1− c)(B + ε¯). (45)
Such ξ > 0 exists due to (39), (41) and (42), respectively.
For all i = 1, . . . , n and β ∈ Rn, let ui(β) be defined by uii(β) = u′i and uij(β) = u′j + βjρ.
Furthermore, define
Wi = {ui(β) : βj ∈ {0, 1} for all j ∈ N \ {i}}.
Due to our choice of ρ (recall that (ii) above states that ||uˆ − u′|| ≤ ρ implies uˆ ∈ U˜0),
Wi ⊆ U˜0. Define Wˆ = ∪ni=1Wi. Since Wˆ is finite, order Wˆ = {uˆ1, . . . , uˆω¯}, where ω¯ = |Wˆ |.
For notational convenience, let uˆ0 = u and W = Wˆ ∪ {uˆ0}.
For all k ∈ N, let Vk be the set of u′′ ∈ co(u(A)) such that u′′ =
∑
a∈A p
au(a)/k for
some {pa}a∈A satisfying pa ∈ N and pa ≥ n + ω + Q + 2 for all a ∈ A \ {s′, s}, ps′ ≥ 3,
ps ≥ 2(n + ω¯ + Q + 2) and ∑a∈A pa = k. Using an analogous argument to Sorin (1992,
Proposition 1.3), it follows that Vk converges to co(u(A)). Therefore, let K ∈ N such that
K > n and co(u(A)) ⊆ ∪x∈VKBξ(x). (46)
As before, order all the actions in A = {a1, . . . , a|A|} as follows: a1 = s, a2, . . . , a|D¯(s)|+1
are the different elements D¯(s), in any order, a|D¯(s)|+2 = s′, a|D¯(s)|+3, . . . , a|D¯(s)|+|D¯(s
′)|+2 are
the different elements of D¯(s′), in any order, and all the remaining actions are then ordered
arbitrarily.
For all ω ∈ {0, . . . , ω¯}, let xω ∈ VK be such that
||xω − uˆω|| < ξ (47)
and {pωa}a∈A be such that 1K
∑K
a∈A p
ω
auj(a) = x
ω
j for all j ∈ N . For all ω ∈ {0, . . . , ω¯}, define
pˆi(ω) as the repetition of the cycle(
(s′; 2), (s;n+ ω + 2 +Q), s′, (a1; p(ω),1), . . . , (a|A|; p(ω),|A|)
)
,
58
where p(ω),j = pωaj − 3 if aj = s′, p(ω),j = pωaj − (n + ω + 2 + Q) if aj = s and p(ω),j = pωaj
otherwise. Note that the length of the cycle is K, i.e.
∑|A|
j=1 p
(ω),j + n + 5 + ω + Q = K for
all ω ∈ {0, . . . , ω¯}. In the construction below, pˆi(ω) will be the equilibrium path when ω = 0
(also sometimes denoted by pi(0)) and a “reward path” when ω > 0.
Let δ∗ ∈ [δ¯, 1) be such that for all δ ≥ δ∗, letting t(δ) be as in Lemma 2,
sup
x∈[−B,B]K
∣∣∣∣∣ 1− δ1− δK
K∑
k=1
δk−1xk − 1
K
K∑
k=1
xk
∣∣∣∣∣ < ξ, (48)
|δt(δ) − c| < ε2, (49)
t(δ) > n+Q+ 4 +K, (50)
δt(δ)(ρε2 − 4ξ) > (1− δt(δ))2B, (51)
δ(γ+2)(n+Q+4)
(1− δγ)(ud(a¯(d))− ud(md))
(1− δ)2B > 1, (52)
−(1− δK)B + δK(u′d − 2ξ) > (1− δ(γ+2)(n+Q+4)+1)B + δ(γ+2)(n+Q+4)+1(1− δt(δ))ε¯
+ δ(γ+2)(n+Q+4)+1+t(δ)(u′d + 2ξ) for all d ∈ N,
(53)
and
−(1− δ(γ+2)(n+Q+4)+t(δ))B + δ(γ+2)(n+Q+4)+t(δ)(u′d + (1− 2ε2)ρ− 2ξ) >
(1− δ(γ+2)(n+Q+4)+1)B + δ(γ+2)(n+Q+4)+1(1− δt(δ))ε¯+ δ(γ+2)(n+Q+4)+1+t(δ)(u′d + 2ξ)
for all d ∈ N.
(54)
Note that such δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) exists because (i) by Lemma 2, (49) holds for all δ > δ¯, (ii) the
limits of the left hand side of (48), (50), (51), (52), (53) and (54), as δ → 1 are, respectively,
0, +∞, c(ρε2− 4ξ), γ(ud(a¯(d))−ud(md))2B (and the latter is strictly above 1 due to (33)), (u′d− 2ξ)
and −(1− c)B + c(u′d + (1− 2ε2)ρ− 2ξ), (iii) the limits of the right hand side of (51), (53)
and (54), as δ → 1 are, respectively, (1 − c)2B, (1 − c)ε¯ + c(u′d + 2ξ), (1 − c)ε¯ + c(u′d + 2ξ)
and (iv) conditions (43)–(45) hold.
Fix any δ ≥ δ∗ and set T = t(δ). Note that by Lemma 2 and (40), δT > ζ. Thus, by
Lemma 1, for every d ∈ N and hˆ = (aˆ1, . . . , aˆT ) ∈ HT such that αdi (hˆ, δ, Q, η) = 1 for all
i 6= d, we have
1− δ
1− δT
T∑
k=1
δk−1ud(aˆk) < ε1. (55)
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Define the size of the memory M ∈ N as follows
M ≥ (γ + 3)(n+Q+ 4) + T + n+ ω¯ +Q+ 4. (56)
We next define M -memory SPE strategy profile f with ||U(f)− u|| < ε. We first start with
the mixed actions to be played during the punishment phases.
B.2.2 The minmax and the payoffs of reward phases
Let C : W → Rn be defined by setting C(uˆω) = V (pˆi(ω)) for all 0 ≤ ω ≤ ω¯. For any d ∈ N
and hˆ = (aˆ1, . . . , aˆT ) ∈ HT we define the reward payoff after a punishment phase by
w(d, hˆ) = C(ud(αd(hˆ))),
where αd(hˆ) = (αd1(hˆ), . . . , α
d
n(hˆ)). Also, let ω(d, hˆ) be such that uˆ
ω(d,hˆ) = ud(αd(hˆ)).
For all d ∈ N let fd : ∪T−1t=0 Ht → ∆ and V d : ∪T−1t=0 Ht → Rn be such that the following
property holds: For all 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1, hˆ ∈ Ht and i ∈ N :
(a) If `(hˆ) = T − 1 and TQ+1(hˆ) ∈ ∪l∈LΣˆl,Q+1, then fd−d(hˆ) = s′−d, fdd (hˆ) solves
max
ad∈Ad
[(1− δ)ud(ad, s′−d) + δwd(d, hˆ · (ad, s′−d))]
and V di (hˆ) = (1− δ)ui(fd(hˆ)) + δwi(d, hˆ · fd(hˆ)).
(b) If `(hˆ) = T − 1 and TQ+1(hˆ) 6∈ ∪l∈N Σˆl,Q+1, then fdi (hˆ) solves
max
σi∈∆i
[(1− δ)ui(σi, fd−i(hˆ)) + δ
∑
a∈A
(σi, f
d(hˆ))[a]wi(d, hˆ · a)]
and V di (hˆ) = (1− δ)ui(fd(hˆ)) + δ
∑
a∈A f
d(hˆ)[a]wi(d, hˆ · a).
(c) If either hˆ = H0 or `(hˆ) < T −1 and TQ+1(hˆ) ∈ ∪l∈N Σˆl,Q+1, then fd−d(hˆ) = s′−d, fdd (hˆ)
solves
max
ad∈Ad
[(1− δ)ud(ad, s′−d) + δV d,aˆd (hˆ · (ad, s′−d))]
and V di (hˆ) = (1− δ)ui(fd(hˆ)) + δV di (hˆ · fd(hˆ)).
(d) If `(hˆ) < T − 1 and TQ+1(hˆ) 6∈ ∪l∈N Σˆl,Q+1, then fdi (hˆ) solves
max
σi∈∆i
[(1− δ)ui(σi, fd−i(hˆ)) + δ
∑
a∈A
(σi, f
d(hˆ))[a]V di (hˆ · a)]
and V di (hˆ) = (1− δ)ui(fd(hˆ)) + δ
∑
a∈A f
d(hˆ)[a]V di (hˆ · a).
The existence of fd and V d can be established using, for each fixed (d, aˆ), backwards
inductions and Nash’s existence theorem.
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B.2.3 The complete profile
For all d ∈ N , let s∗d ∈ Ad be a static best-reply to s′−d, i.e. ud(s∗d, s′−d) ≥ ud(ad, s′−d) for all
ad ∈ Ad. For all τ ∈ N and d ∈ N define
Σd,τ =
{
h ∈ H : h = (at)τt=1 such that at ∈ Dd(s) if t = 3, . . . , d+Q+ 3
and at ∈ Dd(s′) if t = 1, 2, d+Q+ 4
}
with Σd,0 = {H0}.
Define for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, ω ∈ {0, . . . , ω¯}, d ∈ N and τ, r ∈ N0 the following sets:46
H
(ω),k
1,a =
{
h ∈ H : T k(h) = (pˆi(ω),1, . . . , pˆi(ω),k)} ,
H
(ω),k
1,b =
{
h ∈ H : h = (pˆi(ω),1, . . . , pˆi(ω),k)} ,
H
(ω),k
1 = H
(ω),k
1,a ∪H(ω),k1,b ,
Hk,d,τ2 =
{
h ∈ H : T k(h) = h¯ · a · h˜ such that for some k′ ≤ k and ω ∈ {0, . . . , ω¯}
(1) either h¯ ∈ H(ω),k′1,a with k′ ≥ n+ ω +Q+ 5 or h¯ ∈ H(ω),k
′
1,b with `(h) = k,
k′ < n+Q+ 5 and ω = 0, (2) a ∈ D¯d(pˆi(ω),k′+1), (3) h˜ ∈ Σd,τ and
(4) if T d+Q+3(h¯ · a) = ((s′; 2), (s; d+Q), a) and a ∈ D¯d(s), then `(h˜) = 0
}
,
Hˆk,d3,a =
{
h ∈ H : T k(h) = h¯ · h˜ such that (1) h¯ ∈ Σd,d+Q+4 and
(2) if `(h˜) > 0 where h¯ = (a¯1, . . . , a¯d+Q+4) and h˜ = (a˜1, . . . , a˜`(h˜)) and
(l − 1)(γ + 1) + 1 ≤ t ≤ l(γ + 1) for some l ∈ {1, . . . , d+Q+ 4},
then a˜t−d =

s′−d if t = l(γ + 1)
a¯
(d)
−d if a¯
l ∈ {s′, s} and t 6= l(γ + 1)
md−d if a¯
l 6∈ {s′, s} and t 6= l(γ + 1).
},
Hk,d3,a =
 Hˆ
k,d
3,a if k < (γ + 2)(d+Q+ 4),
∅ otherwise,
Hˆk,d3,b =
{
h ∈ H : T k(h) = h¯ · h˜ with (1) h¯ ∈ Hˆ(γ+2)(d+Q+4),d3,a ,
(2) if h˜ = (a˜1, . . . , a˜`(h˜)) and l(h˜) > 0, then a˜1−d = s
′
−d, and
(3) if (a˜τ , . . . , a˜τ+Q) ∈ Σˆl,(Q+1) for some τ < `(h˜)−Q and l ∈ N , then a˜τ+Q+1−d = s′−d
}
,
46Note that, for some of these parameters, the sets below may be empty.
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Hk,d3,b =
 Hˆ
k,d
3,b if k < (γ + 2)(d+Q+ 4) + T,
∅ otherwise,
Hk,ω,r4 =
{
h ∈ H : T k(h) = h¯ · h˜ such that for some d ∈ N,
(1) `(h¯) = (γ + 2)(d+Q+ 4) + T, (2) h¯ ∈ Hˆ`(h¯),d3,b , (3) h˜ ∈ Hω,r1,b , and
(4) ω = ω(d, T T (h¯))
}
,
Hk,d,τ5 =
{
h ∈ H : T k(h) = h¯ · a · h˜ such that for some k′ ≤ k and d′ ∈ N
(1) h¯ and a satisfy one the following conditions :
(1.a) d′ 6= d and (l − 1)(γ + 1) + 1 ≤ k′ − (d′ +Q+ 4) + 1 ≤ l(γ + 1)
for some 1 ≤ l ≤ d′ +Q+ 4 and h¯ ∈ Hk′,d′3,a and
a ∈

D¯d(s
∗
d′ , s
′
−d′) if k
′ − (d′ +Q+ 4) + 1 = l(γ + 1),
D¯d(a¯
(d′)) if k′ − (d′ +Q+ 4) + 1 6= l(γ + 1) and a¯l ∈ {s′, s}
D¯d(m
d′) if k′ − (d′ +Q+ 4) + 1 6= l(γ + 1) and a¯l 6∈ {s′, s},
(1.b) d 6= d′ and h¯ ∈ Hk′,d′3,b and if either k′ = (γ + 2)(d+Q+ 4)
or k′ > (γ + 2)(d+Q+ 4) and TQ+1(h¯) ∈ ∪l∈N Σˆl,Q+1 for some l, then ad 6= s′d,
(1.c) h¯ ∈ Hk′,ω,r4 for some ω = 1, . . . , ω¯ and a ∈ D¯d(pˆi(ω),r+1)
for some r < n+ ω +Q+ 5,
(2) h˜ ∈ Σd,τ and
(3) if T d+Q+3(h¯ · a) = ((s′; 2), (s; d+Q), a) and a ∈ D¯d(s), then `(h˜) = 0
}
.
We next define H1,a = ∪ω¯ω=0
(
∪Mk=n+ω+Q+5H(ω),k1,a
)
, H
(0),0
1,b = {H0}, H1,b = ∪n+Q+4k=0 H(0),k1,b ,
H1 = H1,a ∪ H1,b, H2 = ∪Mk=1
(
∪d∈N
(
∪d+Q+3τ=0 Hk,d,τ2
))
, H3,a = ∪Mk=1
(
∪d∈NHk,d3,a
)
, H3,b =
∪Mk=1
(
∪d∈NHk,d3,b
)
, H3 = H3,a ∪ H3,b, H4 = ∪Mk=1
(
∪ω¯ω=1
(
∪n+ω+Q+4r=0 Hk,ω,r4
))
, and H5 =
∪Mk=1
(
∪d∈N
(
∪d+Q+3τ=0 Hk,d,τ5
))
.
Let Σ˜d,τ = {h ∈ H : T τ+1(h) = a · h˜, h˜ ∈ Σd,τ and a ∈ D¯d(s) ∪ D¯d(s′)} for all d ∈ N and
τ ∈ N0. Define, for all d ∈ N and τ ∈ {0, . . . , d+Q+ 3},
Hd,τ6 =
(
H \ ∪5l=1Hl
) ∩ Σ˜d,τ .
Let H6 = ∪d∈N
(
∪d+Q+3τ=0 Hd,τ6
)
. Also, for all t ∈ {0, . . . , n+Q+ 4}, define
H t7 = {h ∈ H \ ∪6l=1Hl : T t(h) ∈ H(0),t1,b }.
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The strategy f is now defined as follows. Let h ∈ H.
If h ∈ H(0),k1,b for some k ∈ {0, . . . , n+Q+ 4}, then f(h) = pˆi(0),k+1.
If h ∈ H(ω),k1,a for some ω ∈ {0, . . . , ω¯} and k ∈ {n + ω + Q + 5, . . . ,M}, then f(h) =
pˆi(ω),k+1.
If h ∈
(
∪Mk=1 ∪d∈N ∪d+Q+2τ=2 (Hk,d,τ2 ∪Hk,d,τ5 ∪Hd,τ6 )
)
∪
(
∪n+Q+3t=2 H t7
)
, then f(h) = s.
If h ∈ Hk,d3,a for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and d ∈ N and k − (d + Q + 4) = l(γ + 1) − 1 for
some 1 ≤ l ≤ d+Q+ 4, then f(h) = (s∗d, s′−d).
If h ∈ Hk,d3,a for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and d ∈ N and (l − 1)(γ + 1) ≤ k − (d + Q + 4) <
l(γ + 1) − 1 for some 1 ≤ l ≤ d + Q + 4 and T k(h) = (a1, . . . , ak), then f(h) = a¯(d) if
al ∈ {s′, s} and f(h) = md if al 6∈ {s′, s}.
If h ∈ Hk,d3,b for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and d ∈ N then f(h) = fd(T k−(γ+2)(d+Q+4)(h)).
If h ∈ Hk,ω,r4 for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and r ∈ {0, . . . , n+ω+Q+ 4} and ω ∈ {1, . . . , ω¯},
then f(h) = pˆi(ω),r+1.
Otherwise, f(h) = s′.
By construction, clearly, f has M -memory.
Lemma 3 f is a well-defined SPE strategy profile and pi(f) = pˆi(0).
The proof of Lemma 3 is presented in the supplementary materials.
To complete the proof of Theorem 2 we need to show that ‖U(f) − u‖ < ε. But this
follows from pi(f) = pˆi(0) in Lemma 3 and
||V (pˆi(0), δ)− u|| ≤ ||V (pˆi(0), δ)− x0||+ ||x0 − u|| < 2ξ < ε
(the second inequality follows from (47) and (48) and the third from ξ < ε/2).
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